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Abstract
This dissertation comprises two different financial essays. Essay 1, “An Applied Credit
Score Model,” uses data from local credit union to predict the probability of default. Due to
recent financial crisis regulation has been enacted that makes it essential to develop a probability
of default model that will mitigate charge-off losses. Using discriminant analysis and logistic
regression this paper will attempt to see how well credit score can predict probability of default.
While credit score does an adequate job at classifying loans, misclassification of loans can be
costly. Thus while credit score is a predictor, there is danger in relying solely on its information.
Thus other variables are needed in order to more accurately be able to find the probability of
default. Essay 2, “Christian Mutual Fund Performance,” draws attention to a much ignored type
of funds, Christian mutual funds. The following questions are asked: How does Christian mutual
fund perform compared to the market? Is there a difference in performance during recessions as
indicated by literature? Is Christian mutual fund performance different than SRI funds? How do
Catholic and Protestant fund perform? Looking at qualitative evidence, Christian mutual funds
place much more importance on moral issue than SRI funds. Thus there is a clear difference in
objectives and the type of screening that these two mutual fund pursue. Overall data reflects that
screened data perform worse than the market, however during recession screened funds perform
as well and at times better than the market. Christian mutual funds tends to perform worse than
SRI funds.

Keywords: Credit Score, Probability of Default, Loans, Mutual Fund Performance, Religion
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Chapter 1
Essay 1: An Applied Credit Scoring Model
1. Introduction
The banking industry has gone through several changes in the last 60 years. These changes have
in part to do with regulatory changes and financial product innovation. Yet one thing has
remained: the demand and dominance of consumer lending. Consumer credit loans have
increased in the banking industry, in general, as well as in Credit Unions in the last 60 years.
Consumer loans have contributed to the way of life for many Americans. For many Americans
who have wanted to increase their standard of living, consumer loans have been the answer.
Research has shown that consumer loan is among the most profitable loan a bank can make.
However, Functional Cost Analysis (FCA) program conducted by the Federal Reserve found that
consumer loans are among the most risky and costly loanable funds that a bank grants to their
customer. Recovering a loan is dependent upon the consumer’s economic state, heath state, and
many times moral character. Consumer loans, furthermore, are ascertained to be cyclical with the
overall state of the economy. With this uncertainty surrounding consumer lending, it poses a
challenge for banks to predict loan portfolio risk. The recent subprime crises accentuate the need
for measuring the portfolio risk of banks. Capturing the risk for their mortgages, small business
loans, or individual borrowers influences the financial institution in making appropriate interest
rate, lending policy, and reserve requirement changes.
There are different types of consumer loans: residential mortgage, non-residential loans,
and credit card loans. Consumer loans are a very profitable form of loans since they are usually
priced well above the cost of funding them. However, since the financial state of the consumer
can fluctuate due to illness or loss of employment, consumer credit is also among the most risky
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and costly product for banks. For this reason, interest rates are set high for most consumer loans.
Banks thus must be prepared for the event that loans may not be collected. Charge-off can be
defined as an amount of debt that is unlikely to be recovered, thus must be written-off.
According to the Federal Reserve as seen in figure 1, commercial banks’ net charge-off reached
a peak of almost $51 billion in the fourth quarter of 2009, since then it has declined so that in the
first quarter of 2015 the net charge-off is around $8 billion. This, however, is still a considerable
sum of money. Therefore it is critical to be able to predict the possibility of charge-off and the
likelihood of default.
Figure 1: Net Charge-Off
The Net Charge-offs on all loans and leases for all commercial banks reported quarterly and not
seasonally adjusted. The figures are in millions of dollars.

One major advantage that smaller community banks and credit unions have over large
banks is their relationship with customers. A key factor when analyzing a consumer’s loan
application is to have knowledge of the borrower’s character and ability to pay. Knowing the
2

person’s character and thus their sense of moral responsibility is a good indication of their
intentions to pay back. A consumer loan officer also should seek insight of customer’s credit
history. There are over 2,000 credit bureaus in the United States that provide credit rating for
most individuals who has at one time or another, borrowed money. Many banks use credit
scoring system to evaluate their loan application. This system has a major advantage that it can
sift through large quantities of credit application with minimal labor, thus reducing operating
costs. A bank establishes a cutoff point which would yield the greatest net savings in loan losses.
Yet credit scores provide limited information and should not be the only precursor used. Due to
their small size, small banks do not have the same resources as larger banks to calculate portfolio
loan loss.
The current crisis of the subprime mortgages emphasizes the need to have simple models
that are capable of capturing the financial institution population risk. The idea is to find and preidentify certain factors that determine the probability of default for a given loan or credit by
using quantitative scores. In some cases, the score can be interpreted as a probability of default.
The score may be used to classify or quantify the potential of default or to group a borrower into
a “good” or “bad” category. Credit scoring systems are also known as behavioral scoring, in
which scores try to predict behavioral trends exhibited by customers. Credit scoring applies logic
to behavioral results and provides warning reports to portfolio management personnel on credits
that possess undesirable behavioral attributes deemed to be associated with greater potential loss.
Attributes of credit scoring systems may include, but are not limited to, updates of loan
accounting system information, updates of loan deposit information, and updates of information
from personal and/or business credit bureau files. With a credit scoring system, accounts can be
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queued to portfolio management personnel for risk grade establishment and exposure
assessment.
The purpose of this study is to aid small community banks and credit unions in
constructing a model that will predict portfolio loan risk. This study will define consumer
lending and highlight some interesting statistics relating to the current status of consumer lending
in the banking industry. We will also analyze different types of models and methodology that has
been used in the past. This study will provide valuable information to the portfolio manager of a
bank which is essential to making the correct decision regarding consumer loans. We found that
credit score is able to accurately identify default loans by 85%. However, they misclassify loans
that defaulted as pay-off loans by almost 15%. Thus, using credit score as a sole predictor of
default can be costly. Credit score can only explain 43% of probability of default. And thus other
variables need to be included.

2. Literature Review
Tufano (2009) defines consumer finance as “the study of how institutions provide goods
and services to satisfy the financial functions of households, how consumers make financial
decisions, and how government action affects the provision of financial services.” Although in
academic research corporate finance overshadows consumer finance in asset value the consumer
sector dominates the corporate sector. The recent economic crisis attests to the importance of the
consumer sector. Though there may be several different factors that contributed to the economic
recession, without a doubt the subprime mortgage market played a big role. Thus it is important
to understand consumer finance. Banks play a large role in consumer lending yet one of their
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greatest challenges is to find ways to prevent loan losses. Therefore a probability of default
model for portfolio loan is essential.
Risk Management
Regulations and risk management procedures are another important reason for probability
of default models. One key component that bank managers are concerned with is asset
management. Managers are tasked to minimize risk by diversifying their portfolio and acquiring
assets with low default risk. A big part of this is managing credit risk.
One standard that has been put emplace to address credit risk was formed by the G-10
central banks that established the Basel Accords. Basel Accords establish uniform capital
requirements across nations in order to “strengthen the soundness and stability of the
international banking system” and to decrease “competitive inequality among international
banks” (Basle, 1988). Basel I agreement was issued in 1988 and focuses on capital requirements
on assets with differing credit risks. Basel I set up a framework on how to categorize asset into
five risk categories (0, 10, 20, 50 and 100%). An international operating bank is required to have
8% or less risk weight. Basel II, a revision of the previous framework, was agreed upon in June
2004, but was going to be implemented in late 2007; however the financial crisis interrupted full
implementation. The main objective of Basel II was to revise the previous framework to be more
risk-sensitive (Basle, 2006). They developed a three pillar concept: 1. Minimum capital
requirements, 2. Supervisory review, and 3. Market discipline. While the previous provision
focused on credit risk, this new agreement also ensures that operational risk and market risk be
quantified along with credit risk in order to have the appropriate capital adequacy in banks.
Supervisor develops review procedures that use assessment of risk tools in order to ensure that
banks have adequate capital. Disclosure is also an important factor of the third pillar. Due to the
5

disruption of the implementation from the financial crisis, a new framework was drafted, but as
of yet not fully implemented. The new accord’s objective is to make banks more resilient and
able to absorb financial and economic stress shocks (BIS 2011). This new accord thus attempts
to strengthen the three pillars by improving risk management, governance and disclosure. The
committee also reinforces fundamental microprudential regulations as well as introduced
macropruedential regulations.
After the Financial Crisis, stress testing programs have been put in place in order to test
bank’s ability to react to stressful situations, such as an economic crisis. The main objective is to
put banks in a hypothetical hostile condition in order to ascertain up to what point the bank will
be able to remain afloat. Regulatory agencies, as well as individual banks, may perform these
tests in order to determine their weak spots in order to take corrective action. While stress test
look at ten different factors, one factor is the bank’s exposure to default. Banks may use their
own risk management default model in order to find their exposure at defaults. Two primary
factors that are used is the probability of default (the likelihood that the borrower will not be able
to pay back the loan) and the loss given default (the loss that a bank endures due to borrower
default on the loan). Thus it is becoming increasingly important that a bank create their own
model to predict default.
Classical Probability of Default Models
Since bank loan information is hard to come by, probability of default is generally
modeled using corporate securities, specifically bonds. There has been a different progression of
probability of default models over the years. There are two principal models in literature
regarding corporate default: structural approach pioneered by Merton (1974) and reduced-form
approach developed by Jarrow & Turnbull (1995). Merton (1974) was one of the first to develop
6

a model of probability of default for bonds. His purpose was to develop a theory in which he
could price bonds that had significant probability of default. Merton’s model was of the first
generation that linked the probability of default with firm’s asset volatility and leverage. Thus
the probability of default is driven by the company’s asset value and its variability. However,
Merton assumes that a default can only occur at maturity, has limitation in bond contract, and it
dismisses the possibility of reorganization. Merton’s framework was adopted soon after by many
researchers such as Geske (1977), Smith & Warner (1979), and Black & Cox (1976). Geske
extended the model to show that risky securities can be valued as compound options. Smith &
Warner also employs the model to investigate the relationship between the ways debt contracts
are written and the conflict between stockholders and bondholders. Black & Cox sought to
expand Merton’s model by fixing some of Merton’s simplified assumption. In their extended
model they explored the effect of three different, yet standard, bond indentures: safety covenants,
subordination arrangements, and restrictions on the financing of interest and dividend payments.
They found that these provisions positively affect the value of the bond. Their model also takes
into account bankruptcy cost. Both Merton’s and Black & Cox’s extension however still assumes
that interest rate is constant. Longstaff & Schwartz (1995) strived to remedy this by
incorporating both default risk and interest rate risk to both closed-form valuation of floating rate
and fixed rate debt. Even with all these improvements, the structural model has one huge
drawback according to Duffie & Singleton (2003) the firm’s assets are neither traded nor
observed. Jarrow & Turnball (1992, 1995) thus developed an alternative model which sought to
address this problem. The reduced form model, as it later became known, values stock using a
stochastic process that takes exogenously both the default-free term structure and the risky debt
term structure. Jarrow, Lando, & Turnbull (1997) extend the model by presenting a finite state
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using Markov chain model in the firm’s credit rating. Lando (1998) generalizes Jarrow et al.
model using Cox process. This framework allows dependency between credit risk and market
risk factors. This model thus reduces the technical difficulties caused by default correlations.
While both models are helpful, they both have drawbacks. Zhou (2001) thus attempts to
combine the models in such a way that it would retain the advantages of both the structural and
reduced-form approach. The structural model followed a diffusion process which does not allow
a sudden drop in firm value; the reduced-form approach however regards default as only an
unpredictable Poisson event. Thus Zhou’s framework includes both default risk and interest rate
risk and allows for the default to possess both a continuous and a jump component. Jarrow
(2009) writes a comprehensive paper comparing the structural and the reduced form models and
concludes that the reduced form model is the better credit risk model. Another area of research
that is related to calculating the probability of default is to valuating the recovery rate in the
event that default occurs.
Banks
While much work has been done on measuring the probability of default and recovery
rate on bonds and options, much less have been done on bank loans. Yet bonds and bank loans
are monitored differently. While loans are monitored by bank managers, bonds must be
monitored by the public who holds them. There is a dichotomy of information between the two.
Where the bank has superior resources and information on their borrower, bondholder usually
does not. Thus there is a monitoring advantage of banks over bondholders (Diamond 1984).
Recently, there has been a growth in loan securitization. This has brought about a fear of
monitoring deterioration and moral hazard behavior. Loan securitization could give the bank the
opportunity of getting rid of “lemon” loans and keep only the best quality loans. However, moral
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hazard can be mitigated, and banks still have a monitoring advantage compared to public bonds
(Altman, Gande, Saunders, 2010). In fact Altman et al. found evidence that loan returns Granger
cause bond returns before firm defaults on its loans. Altman & Suggitt (2000) assess the default
rate experience on large, syndicated bank loans. According to them, the most fundamental aspect
of credit risk models is the rating of the underlying credit asset and the associated expected and
unexpected risk migration patterns. The mortality rates on bank loans are extremely similar to
corporate bonds, but loan default rates appear to be noticeably higher than bonds for the first two
years after issuance. Thus, in the first two years after issuance, loan default rates are higher than
bond default rates.
A very interesting result is found using loans from a Spanish credit institution from 19882000 (Jimenez, & Saurina, 2004). They analyze the determinant of probability of default
focusing on three variables: collateral, type of lender, and bank-borrower relationship. They find
that collateral for a loan actually increases the probability of default of a loan. While this may
sound counterintuitive, their theory relates that banks tend to screen less on a loan in which
collateral is provided. The risk of default was found to be affected by the type of lender, or the
type of bank giving the loan. The model revealed that savings banks have a higher risk
compared to commercial banks’ loans. One explanation for this is that the savings’ banks are
controlled by managers, as opposed to commercial banks which are controlled by shareholders.
Regarding relationship banking, it was found that the closer the relationship between the firm
and the bank, the higher the risk of default. If a firm is being financed by only one bank and
thus shows a greater commitment to that bank, the bank will be more likely to take on the risk,
and thus the probability of default is higher. This paper thus strongly encourages the use of
thorough screening process when making loan decisions in order to avoid high default rates.
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Jacobson, & Roszbach (2003) create a model that determines a bank’s decision on whether or
not to approve a loan and the borrower’s risk of default on that loan. The researchers used loan
applications collected from a Swedish lending agency between September 1994 and August
1995. The data included the number of the applicant, the date submitted, size of the loan, status
on whether the loan was good or bad as of October 1996, and what date the loan reached the
bad status also other demographical information was included such as sex, marital status,
residence, citizenship, age, income, wealth, and homeownership status. After discarding
variables due to endogeneity issues, they found that the income level of the applicant, whether
the applicant owns a house, whether the applicant has taxable income from a business, loans
outstanding, and the existence of a guarantor all have a positive effect on whether or not the
applicant gets approved for a loan. The income variable stood out because even though an
applicant with a higher income was more likely to have his or her loan approved, the applicant
was more likely to default on the loan. Several of the variables that affected the loan approval
decision do not affect the loan’s risk of default. Another interesting find was that the size of the
loan itself does not alter the loan’s chance of being defaulted on. A borrower was no more likely
to default on a larger loan than default on a small loan. Looking at portfolio loans for a Farm
Credit District, three ratios was identified to be significant in explaining the probability of
default for the data set loans: repayment capacity, owner equity, and working capital
(Featherstone & Roessler, & Barry, 2006). Another discovery that was made was that as loans
age increase, the probability of default decreases. This is a logical result since the longer a loan
continues without defaulting, the more stable the payments have been for a longer period of
time, and the default rate will be lower.
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Featherstone, Roessler, and Barry (2006) conducted research on credit analysis. The
primary risk that financial institutions face is credit risk, and thus they most perform some-type
of risk-taking systems. These ratings serve multiple purposes, including contributing to the loan
origination process, aiding in monitoring the safety and soundness of loan portfolios, and in
management reporting, facilitating adequacy of loan reserves, and providing components of
loan pricing profitability analysis systems. The “fundamental goal” of a credit risk-rating
system is to accurately estimate the credit risk of a specific transaction or portfolio of
transactions/assets. The “ultimate goal” is to measure the expected and unexpected loss from
investing in an asset and the capital required to support it. Default mode and mark-to-market
are the two main approaches to measuring credit risks identified in the literature (Barry 2001).
The default mode approach “focuses directly on the possibilities of loan loss, including
probability of default and the severity of loss given that default has occurred.” The mark-tomarket approach attempts to measure how future changes in the credit risk characteristics of a
loan or a group of loans will affect the loan(s) market value, including potential losses in value.
Furthermore, the new Basel Accord may allow lenders to benefit from a more accurate risk
rating of their loan portfolio. The goals of the Basel Accord are to tailor risk management of the
financial institution and to increase segmentation of the loan portfolio by risk rating. Wilson
(2000) found that banks are more likely to fail if they have low capitalization, higher ratios of
loan to asset, and poor quality of loan portfolios. Lopez (2002) looks at the relationship between
firm’s probability of default, asset size and average asset correlation. He found that the average
asset correlation negatively correlates with the probability of default. Thus the probability of
default is not closely related with the macroeconomic environment instead default is mainly due
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to idiosyncratic factors. This brings into question whether Basel accords regard for other type of
risks are warranted. Wheelock and
The Great Recession
The importance of consumer lending became obvious during the Great Recession. One
key factor of the Great Recession was due to the increase subprime and near-prime lending,
which was further aggravated by the securitization of these loans. The Financial Crisis of 2008
followed similar trends to other crisis (Demyanyk & Van Hemert, 2011). First, there was an
evident boom in the subprime mortgage market. Second, a bust occurred in 2007 which is
signaled by house foreclosures, high delinquencies and default rates. The subprime crisis led to
spill over into other credit markets. The crisis intensified when underwriting standards
deteriorated along with loan quality which led to an increase in loan risk that was not reflected
by an increase in price, which led to a collapse in the market.
Kwan (2001), using data from nine years from Merrill Lynch and Fannie Mae , finds the
average annual growth rate of subprime mortgages was 26 percent. Kwan concludes that
subprime loans can affect credit values and the loans that are tied in with them. With an increase
in subprime lending in the 2000s due to predatory practices, it was only a matter of time for a
banking crisis to occur. The credit boom emanated from 2001 – 2006 and bust in 2007, mainly
due to the large subprime securitized mortgage market (Demyanyk & Hasan, 2010). In 2008, the
subprime securitized mortgage market was roughly around $1.8 trillion which is about one-third
of the securitized market and 16% of total mortgage debt. Though many people doubted that
such a comparatively small market could induce such a crisis, the complexity, however, of the
innovated security contributed to the collapse. Keys et al. (2008) studied the link between
securitization and screening subprime mortgage backed securities. They found that lenders that
12

are most likely to securitize portfolios have less motivation to screen borrowers and more likely
to default (by 10-25%) compared to those portfolios with similar risk but with less probability of
securitization. Furthermore, Mian & Sufi (2008) revealed a positive relationship between
securitization and subprime lending and subsequent defaults. In geographical zones where
borrowers were once denied credit (in 1996) received an exceptional growth of accepted credit
and later mortgage default. In congruent with the growth in mortgage credit in this area and
decrease in income growth, there was an increase to securitize these subprime mortgages. In
2008, Bernanke informed the public that 10% of near-prime mortgages and over 20% of
subprime mortgages were delinquent and 2.25 million foreclosures were initiated. In 2009, these
figures increased to 13% and 25% respectively. While many maligned the nontraditional features
involved in mortgage contracts, Mayer, Pence and Sherlund (2009), found that the biggest reason
delinquency rates were remarkably unmanageable was because it was originated to borrowers
with low credit score and high loan-to-value ratios. LaCour-Little & Zhang (2014) looked at
estimating the probability of default and loss given default for home equity loans around the time
of the financial crisis. In this paper, they compiled data from large commercial banks, where
loans were originated during 2004-2008 and tracked from 2008-2012. They are particularly
interested in the relationship between loan outcomes and the lender decision to securitize the
asset. After they examined loan performances, including LGD for home equity loans they
ascertained that there was an increase in the probability of default among the particular loans that
were securitized. Lending to the corporate sector through loan syndication also suffered during
the 2008 Financial Crisis (Ivashina & Scharfstein, 2010). There was a 37% drop in lending
during September through November period prior to the past three month period and 68%
decline since the peak in 2007. The authors expostulate however, that a decrease in lending does
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not necessary mean a reduction in credit supply. A decrease in lending is due to a reflection of
the increase in risk. However, they noted that banks with a “strong base of deposits” will cut
their lending less. For example, in August-November 2008 period, the median range bank
reduced lending by 38% while a bank with a deposit of one standard deviation below (above)
reduced their lending by 51% (14%). Thus a bank with a solid deposit intake are inherently less
risky and are capable of lending even through the crisis.
Credit Scores Literature
Before the emergence of credit score, credit worthiness was measured in various ways,
but normally boiled down to a judgment call (Fensterstock, 2003). A loan officer would base
their decision off a system that captures the borrowers Character, Capacity, Capital, and
Condition; also known as the four C’s. Saunders & Allan (2010) includes another C, Collateral.
Other than these factors, managers also had to take interest rate into account. Loan managers are
aware of the nonlinear relationship between interest rate and expected return on loan. If interest
rates are at a relatively “low” level, by increasing the rate, return should also increase. However
if interest rates are relatively high, the expected return on loan decreases due to adverse selection
and risk shifting. However, due to the subjective nature of loan decisions, individual or business
credit worthiness could vary drastically depending on the loan officer. The judgmental system
uses internal and external credit experience within a formula to determine the score. This method
looks at the customer’s payment history, credit agency ratings, and financial statements among
other factors. However, it is inefficient because it takes copiousness amount of manual work,
especially in the initial set-up of the system. Also, the weights used can be biased because of
irrelevant factors that should not weigh into the situation. It is difficult of the judgmental system
to determine where errors are originating from, which makes it difficult to update and correct the
14

system.
Now, individual’s risk assessment is usually given by their credit score, which is
calculated by credit bureaus, Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO) being the most common. These
credit scores are developed using predictive algorithms that use personal information to estimate
an individuals’ risk (Citron & Pasquale, 2014). FICO was created in 1956, and developed a
three-digit credit score system which scores ranged from 300 to 850 where the lower the score,
the more likelihood the individual would default. In many instances, credit scores are used to
price loans in order to remain objective. According to FICO, their scores are calculated using
credit data which are grouped into five different categories: 1) Payment history; 2) Amounts
owed; 3) Length of credit history; 4) New credit; and 5) Types of credit used.
Credit scores are calculated by determining which factors are pertinent to the score and
multiplying them by a respective weight of importance (Fensterstock, 2003). Credit scores can
get much more complex than that, however, there are four main kinds of credit scoring systems,
including the judgmental system (which we previously mentioned), the neural network-based
system, the statistical-based system, and the genetic algorithm-based system. The last three are
scientific-based and can be up to 30% more accurate than the human judgment system; they also
meet requirements set by Sarbanes-Oxley. Each system has advantages and disadvantages and
different business may use different systems (Fensterstock, 2005).
The neural network-based systems, is able to decide which characteristics are the most
necessary to include in the prediction of credit risk. The basis of this model is to link how the
brain, using a network of neurons, would process information. One of the main advantages of
this model is that it can map out nonlinear relationships between the independent variables and
the predictive variable. The most common model of neural network displays a multilayer
15

perceptron. We see the bottom layer holds the input layers, such as the applicant’s attributes,
however these neurons does not automatically go to the output layer, credit score, but goes
through a hidden layer. Thus the hidden layer receives information inputs from the previous
layers. This hidden layer can also be thought of as the training phase in which information is
provided and the weights are adjusted in order to produce a better output.
There is contradictory evidence of the effectiveness of neural networking for credit
scoring. While Tam and Kian (1992) and Desay, Crook & Overstreet (1996) state that neural
network is a better method, Altman et al. (1994) and West (2000) indicate that linear
discriminate analysis and logistic regression, respectively, perform better and gives more
accurate results. However, one huge drawback of this method is that it lacks explanation of how
and why prediction was achieved. Bank managers using this system will not know the weights or
relationships within the system. This makes it difficult to assess the model’s decisions properly
and accurately.
Statistical-based systems use multivariate regression models to approximate the
probability that a customer will default on their loan. Unlike the judgmental system, weights
assigned to factors are based on statistical assessment rather than human arbitration, thus this
allows a statistical analyst to choose variables to check if a relationship makes financial sense.
This also allows one to correct the accuracy of the model by finding sources of error and
correcting them. However, this system requires someone with a background in statistics and can
be hard to apply in some instances.
The last kind of system is the genetic algorithm-based system based on Charles Darwin’s
theory of “survival of the fittest” and may be the best model. Genetic algorithms (GA) create a
random initial generation of models where the next generation is made up of the best of the first
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generation that have been tested for fitness against specific standards, which means an evolution
of more advanced and accurate models. Unlike the other models, GAs can use 100% of the
available data instead of just selected pieces. On the other hand, this model has been used very
little, especially outside of universities and thus implementing a system that is not fully
understood can be risky.
While there are many ways to estimate credit scores, credit agency does not divulge
estimation of the credit score and thus considered a “black box.” Citron & Pasquale thus names
three problems with the credit score system: 1) their opacity, 2) their arbitrary results, and 3) the
disparate impact. Credit bureaus lack of transparency on their scoring methodology leaves
individuals powerless to understand or challenge their score. Due to this opacity there exist
arbitrary results. Different credit bureaus may present totally differing scores for the same
individual. The secret behind the black box does not assure us of equal opportunity scoring. In
fact, the scoring results show there is a disparate impact where women and minorities are
concerned. Since credit score estimation is based on credit history alone, they fail to classify an
entire group who may not have any credit history due to recent entrance into market, lack of
large consumption in need of credit, or the fact that they rent instead of own assets. While credit
score is a step in the right direction, the past financial crisis has shown that credit can still be
given out incorrectly.

3. Methodology
Two common used methodology when working with probability of default is discriminant
analysis and logistic regression. While both methods are used to analysis data with categorical
outcomes, they do have different underlying assumptions. Linear discriminant analysis assumes
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normal distribution in the explanatory variables. Logistic regression, however, does distribution
assumptions of the independent variables, thus it is more general.
Discriminant Analysis
The main objective of discriminant analysis is “to classify objects into one of two or
more groups based on a set of features that describe the objects” (Gurny & Gurny 2013). In this
case, we seek to classify good borrowers and bad borrowers based on different variables that
describe that person. Thus the basic idea is to determine whether these different groups vary in
means and if they can be used to predict default. Its primary use it to classify and make
predictions where the dependent variable is in qualitative form and then find a linear
combination which “best discriminates between the groups” (Altman, 1968). A disadvantage
using discriminant analysis is their list of assumptions. Data is assumed to be normally
distributed, variance and covariance are homogeneous, there is no correlation between means
and variances, multicollinearity, and random sample.

One advantage of using this method is

that it reduces the space dimensionality by G-1, where G is the number of groups. In our paper,
we only have two groups (Good or Bad) and thus we have one dimension.
Discriminant analysis follows two basic steps. The first step is to estimate the coefficient
of the independent variables, the borrower’s characteristics. The coefficients serve as weights
that measures which variables are good predictors for default. The second step is to apply a
discriminant function to establish a cut-off value. The discriminant function is derived using the
following equation:
𝑍 = 𝑣1 𝑥1 + 𝑣2 𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝑣𝑛 𝑥𝑛

(1)

Where v is the discriminant coefficients and x is the independent variables. The discriminant
function is treated as a standardized variable, so it has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of
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one. The discriminant coefficient maximizes the distances between the means of the dependent
variables, where good predictor variables have the larger coefficient. Thus the discriminant
function coefficient range between values of -1.0 and 1.0 and treated as a standardized variable.
Thus the magnitude of the coefficients indicates the contribution of the independent variable.

Figure 2: Discriminant Function distribution
This is a hypothetical example of two groups (A, B). The discriminant function distribution
diagram measures how well they are able to classify objects. If the overlap of the distribution
function is small, than the function does a good job in classifying objects, if the overlap is large
however there is a large probability of misclassification and thus the function is poor.

An individual’s z-score can be found by simply summing the product of the coefficient
with the independent variable. The group mean is the average of all the individual’s score, also
referred to as the centroid (Stamatis, 2003). The success of the function can be determined by
measuring the group centroid distance from one another. Figure 2 illustrates an example of the
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distribution of scores of two group functions. The key to evaluating the function is by measuring
the overlap of the distribution. Thus the top diagram depicts a statistically significant function
and does well in distinguishing between group A and B. The bottom diagram, however, show
that group have a large overlap, and thus the function has a high probability of misclassifying
borrowers.
Logistic Regression
Since our objective is to find whether loan default will occur or not, than the appropriate
methodology to apply would be logistic regression. Thus logistic regression takes a binary
variable which only takes two values, zero or one. The main objective of a logistic regression is
to find the best fitting model to describe the relationship between the dichotomous characteristic
of interest (the dependent variable) and a set of independent variables. Logistic regression
generates the coefficients of a formula to predict a logit transformation of the probability of the
presence of the loan characteristics. A logit function thus stipulates the probability that default
will occur and one minus this function specifies that default will not occur.
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝑏1 𝑥𝑖1 + 𝑏2 𝑥𝑖2 + ⋯ + 𝑏𝐾 𝑥𝑖𝐾

(2)

𝑧 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛 𝑋𝑛

(3)

This is a standard scoring model in which 𝛼 is a constant and 𝑋𝑠 are independent
variables such as credit score, age, and other loan characteristics. In this paper since we seek to
determine how credit score can find the probability of default of bank loans so our first equation
will be to test this theory. Credit score ratings can be ranked in different groups taking into
account 3734the approved loan amount.
𝑓(𝑧) =

1
1
=
−𝑧
−(𝛼+∑𝛽
𝑛 𝑋𝑛 )
1+𝑒
1+𝑒
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(4)

The output of this equation, which should be between 1 and 0 reveals the riskiness of the bank.
An output of 0 or close to zero means the bank has low risk while an output of 1 or close to one
means the bank has high risk. This logistic function can be rewritten as a logistic model by using
the expression of the probability of X. Logistic regression models the probability associated with
each level of the response variable by finding a linear relationship between predictor variables
and a link function of these probabilities. First we need to link it with our scores variables in
which:
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖 ) = 𝐹(𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 )

(5)

The logistic distribution function can then be written as
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖 ) =

exp(𝑏′𝑥𝑖 )
1
=
1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑏′𝑥𝑖 ) 1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑏′𝑥𝑖 )

(6)

A very common way to estimate the weights of the coefficients is to use the maximum
likelihood method. Maximum likelihood estimation is used and is the product of the sum of the
logit function when default occurs multiplied by the product of the sum of one minus the logit
function when the default does not happen. Then maximize the log of the likelihood function in
order to find the weights:
(𝑌𝑖 =1) 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖 ) = 𝛬(𝑏 ′ 𝑥𝑖 )
(7)
(𝑌𝑖 =0) 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑁𝑜 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖 ) = 1 − 𝛬(𝑏 ′ 𝑥𝑖 )
𝐿𝑖 = (𝛬(𝑏 ′ 𝑥𝑖 ))𝑦𝑖 (1 − 𝛬(𝑏 ′ 𝑥𝑖 ))1−𝑦𝑖
′
′
ln𝐿𝑖 = ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑦𝑖 𝑙𝑛(𝛬(𝑏 𝑥𝑖 )) + (1 − 𝑦𝑖 )𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝛬(𝑏 𝑥𝑖 ))

(8)

The logit model uses the logistic distribution function to link the variables. Two steps are
required in order to find the coefficients: 1. Set first derivative to 0 and 2. Use the Newton’s
method.
′
′
ln𝐿𝑖 = ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑦𝑖 𝑙𝑛(𝛬(𝑏 𝑥𝑖 )) + (1 − 𝑦𝑖 )𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝛬(𝑏 𝑥𝑖 ))

(9)
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(10)
(11)

1.
2.

𝜕𝑙𝑛𝐿
𝜕𝑏

′
= ∑𝑁
𝑖=1(𝑦𝑖 − 𝛬(𝑏 𝑥𝑖 ))𝑥𝑖

𝜕2 𝑙𝑛𝐿
𝜕𝑏𝜕𝑏′

′
′
= − ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝛬(𝑏 𝑥𝑖 )(1 − 𝛬(𝑏 𝑥𝑖 ))𝑥𝑖 𝑥𝑖 ’
−1

𝜕 2 𝑙𝑛𝐿
𝑏1 = 𝑏0 − [
]
𝜕𝑏0 𝑏𝜕𝑏 ′ 0

𝜕𝑙𝑛𝐿
𝜕𝑏0

Lawrence & Arshadi (1995), Campbell & Dietrich (1983), Gardner & Mills (1989) all
use logit models to analyze loans, in fact, Charitou, Neophytou and Charalambous (2004) states
that the logit method is superior when predicting defaults.

4. Data
The data that I will be using is from a local credit union from 2006 to December 2014. I
will be looking at two different datasets: 1) current loan portfolio and 2) charge-off loans. Figure
3 depicts a comparison of the loan portfolio and the charge-off loans. As of December 2014, the
loan portfolio was valued $297,466,374 while the charge off loans were at $147,850.07. So
roughly .05% of their portfolio loans were charged off.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistic of the dataset used. More information has been
collected on the active loans compared to charge-off loans, we received 42,650 active loans.
After cleaning up the data, there are 22,446 active loans. Information about the interest rate,
original balance, current balance, loan maturity, the borrower’s credit score, available credit, and
loan description is given in this data set.
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Figure 3: Charge-offs/Portfolio
The data used is from a local credit union. This graph shows the amount of the active loan portfolio balance and the charge-off during
2006 and end of 2014.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Two different types of dataset was collected from local credit union from 2006 to 2014. Panel A
is the summary statistics of the active loan portfolio. Current and Available balances were
updated December 2014. Panel B is the summary of the charge off loans.
* Available credit, original balance and current balance is in the millions

Panel A: Active Loan Portfolio
Variable
Interest Rate
Credit Score
Available Credit
Original Balance
Current Balance
Maturity

Obs
22446
22446
22446
22446
22446
22446

Mean
8.42
609.18
87136.25
17558.55
12873.98
4.38

Std. Dev
5.22
241.22
364944.2
36581.64
46161.29
6.21

Min
0
0
0
0
0
0

Std. Dev
63.39
12.68
4065.38
12.86
247.65
1.68

Min
439
21
3.2
1.37
2
0.01

Max
24
964
163.36*
1.835*
4.76*
36

Panel B: Charged-off Loans
Variable
Credit Score
Age
Amount
Debt Ratio
Delinquency
Duration

Obs
578
577
578
578
573
571

Mean
601.2
41.39
3536.82
27.38
463.54
2.08

Max
839
83
29443.04
100
1002
13.67

The charge-off loan database is a much smaller dataset with 3,371 observations. After
cleaning up the charge-off data, we were left with 578 observations which can also be seen in
Table 1. The dataset also provides information about the borrower’s age and credit score, and the
loan amount, duration, and loan type. We deleted observations that had missing data for credit
scores and debt ratio. Also some observations seemed to be mistyped (for example an individual
had a 2006 credit score value) and those were also deleted. While having more variables would
be optimal, this is a good starting point and since very few researchers have the availability of
bank data this will provide great insight. Table 2 provides definition of the variables that will be
used throughout this paper. As can clearly be seen both dataset provides different variables with
the exception of credit score which in included in both.
Table 2: Variables Description

Active Loans
The borrower's credit score calculated by FICO indicates there risk
based on credit history
Available The remaining amount of an open line of credit or revolving loan
Credit: (Credit line limit minus borrowed/used amount; since December 2014)
Original
Balance: The loan amount taken out by borrower at issuance date
Current The amount of the loan the borrower still owes (original balance minus
Balance: payments made; since December 2014)
Interest Rate: The cost of borrowing
Maturity: The life of the loan
Credit Score:

Charge-Off
Credit Score:
Age:
Amount:
Debt ratio:
Duration:
Delinquency:

The borrower's credit score calculated by FICO indicates there risk
based on credit history
Age of the principal borrower
The amount of the loan charged-off
Total Debt/Total Assets
The time that borrowers actually paid back the loan (date last paid
minus issuance date)
The time (in days) the borrower has not paid back their loans (since
December 2014)

We then separated the default dataset by loan type and calculated the mean, standard
deviation, and sample size for each individual loan type which is summarized in table 3. Personal
loan, used auto loans, indirect loans and visa loans have the highest number of observation. For
the rest of this paper we will focus on personal, visa and used, indirect, and new auto loans.
Reasonably, auto loans have a larger loan amount then the entire data set (as well as credit
score), while visa and personal loans have a lower loan amount. The data set as a whole is
extremely volatile and randomly distributed. However, it is apparent that loan types with a larger
sample size have a higher standard deviation in relation to the mean, while loans with a smaller
sample size have smaller standard deviations in relation to the sample mean. Thus for the rest of
this analysis we will be using the logarithmic of the variable to normalize the effects.

Table 3: Charge-Off Descriptive Statistics by loan type
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Table 4 indicate different characteristic of good borrowers and their loans. Good
borrowers are defined as borrowers who have a ranking of at least a B. This ranking defines the
original risk of the loan and is assigned by the bank manager. They are assigned a binary variable
of 1, and thus all who have a binary of 0 are classified as bad borrowers. Not surprisingly, the
mean of a good borrower has a credit score of 647 and that of a bad borrower is 498. Thus good
borrowers have significantly higher credit score. Credit score is used to price interest rate for the
borrowers. Thus it makes sense that bad borrowers, who tend to have lower credit scores, also
has higher interest rates. Looking at original balances granted to borrowers, the table indicate
that good borrowers have a significant higher loan amount, almost a $10,000 difference, then bad
borrower. This is a reasonable deduction since banks doubt bad borrower capability to pay off a
big loan while trusting good borrowers’ ability to take on a bigger loan and pay it off. Available
credit is the difference between the credit limit of a credit card and the amount already used.
Thus available credit is the share of the line of credit that has not been spent. As for the case of
original balance, the available credit is statistically significantly larger for good borrowers than
bad borrowers. Good borrowers thus are granted a higher limit than bad borrowers. Maturity of
the loan in this study can be defined as the length of the life of the loan. This was found by
looking at the original date and the due date of the loan. Thus this figure shows that good
borrower tend to have loans with longer maturity than bad loans. In order to reduce the risk of
bad borrower loans they will give them a loan with shorter maturity.
This table also presents the different types of loans that this particular credit union gives
to consumers. A binary variable was created to indicate what type of loans borrowers took out.
The loans available are: auto, personal, share, credit card, end line credit, home equity line,
trailer, second mortgaged, first mortgage, land, or business loan. Another possible explanation of
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Table 4: Borrower and Loan Characteristics
Means of the borrower’s loan characteristics and their significance. Using dummy variables to account
the different type of loans given to borrowers. Where “Good Borrowers” were those borrowers classified
as B risk or above. The rest were classified as “Bad Borrowers”. Their means and differences are
recorded in this table.
*** 1% Statistically Significant
** 5% Statistically Significant
* 10% Statistically Significant

Variable
Credit Score
Interest Rate
Original Balance
Current Balance
Available Credit
Maturity

Variable
Auto Loan
Personal Loan
Share Secured Loan
Credit Card
End line of Credit
Home Equity Line
Trailer Loan
Second Mortgage Loan
First Mortgage Loan
Business Loan
Land Loan

Bad Borrower
[0]
498.33
14.22
10326.65
7829.79
21604.09
3.79

Good Borrower
[1]
647.66
6.40
20069.59
14625.41
109890.20
4.59

Bad Borrower
[0]
0.416
0.249
0.024
0.204
0.049
0.007
0.001
0.007
0.009
0.009
0.003

Good Borrower
[1]
0.451
0.122
0.012
0.280
0.040
0.009
0.009
0.013
0.041
0.000
0.004

Difference[0]-[1]
-149.33
7.82
-9742.94
-6795.63
-88286.11
-0.80

T-statistics
[-43.28]***
[103.99]***
[-22.22]***
[-7.44]***
[-23.39]***
[-9.43]***

Difference[0]-[1]

T-statistics

-0.035
0.127
0.012
-0.076
0.009
-0.002
-0.008
-0.006
-0.031
0.009
-0.001

[-4.58]***
[20.39]***
[5.32]***
[-11.99]***
[2.85]***
[-1.46]*
[-9.66]***
[-3.94]***
[-15.75]***
[7.17]***
[-1.31]*

the larger loan amount for good borrowers is the fact that good borrowers tend to invest in more
expensive tangible items such as autos, homes, and land. Table 4 shows that good borrower take
out more auto loans, home equity lines, trailers, first and second mortgages, and more land loans.
In addition to these investments, good borrowers have more credit cards. Bad borrowers, on the
other hand, tend to take out more personal loans, share secured loan, open end line of credit and
business loans compared to good borrowers.
Table 5 compares the means of the variables for the charge-off dataset categorized into
loan type. For the age characteristic, it is not significant for any loan type except for achiever
loans. The mean age for most charge-off borrowers are in the lower 40s. Therefore, the idea that
younger borrowers are more likely to default on their payment is not substantiated by looking at
just the means. The achiever loan is the only loan that is statistically significant and that its age is
lower than 40s. Achiever loan borrowers are seeking to build credit and one type of borrower
who lacks most in credit history are young adults who have not had the opportunity to build a
history. The charge-off amount is the statistically significant for all the loan types. The highest
charge-off amounts are from auto loans (new, used and indirect loans). Since borrowers take out
larger loans to afford an auto, it stand to reason that they will have higher charge-off amounts.
The achiever loan is the lowest charge-off amount. Other than the fact that there is only few
observations, achiever loans by definition is a small loan with the sole purpose to build up credit.
The credit score variable is significant for all loan types except for used and new auto loans.
Indirect auto and credit card have the highest credit score. Indirect auto loans usually are
originated in the car dealership and then transferred to the bank. Thus the bank does not have
direct contact with the buyer. Credit card application, while many times dealt through the bank,
also has a third party involved, the credit card company (in this case Visa). Thus these third party
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Table 5: Charge-off Loan Characteristics
Dummy variables are assigned to different loan types in the charge-off dataset. The means of variable are
than compared by specific loan versus the rest of the loans.
*** 1% Statistically Significant ** 5% Statistically Significant * 10% Statistically Significant

Variable
Age
Amount
Credit Score
Debt Ratio
Delinquency
Duration
Variable
Age
Amount
Credit Score
Debt Ratio
Delinquency
Duration
Variable
Age
Amount
Credit Score
Debt Ratio
Delinquency
Duration
Variable
Age
Amount
Credit Score
Debt Ratio
Delinquency
Duration
Variable
Age
Amount
Credit Score
Debt Ratio
Delinquency
Duration
Variable
Age
Amount
Credit Score
Debt Ratio
Delinquency
Duration

Other Loans [0]
40.74
4716.82
608.56
26.58
409.25
2.65
Other Loans [0]
41.24
3642.60
599.68
27.28
452.33
1.96
Other Loans [0]
41.59
3253.52
598.29
27.78
489.06
2.04
Other Loans [0]
41.86
2811.39
600.14
27.98
487.95
1.87
Other Loans [0]
41.28
3396.43
601.00
27.43
468.66
2.03
Other Loans [0]
41.47
3579.81
602.39
27.14
466.97
2.10

Personal Credits [1]
42.34
1630.66
589.30
28.67
551.95
1.14
Credit Cards [1]
42.51
2443.78
616.90
28.42
583.41
3.36
Indirect Auto [1]
40.03
5135.66
617.60
25.13
321.00
2.30
Used Auto [1]
40.19
5207.39
603.62
25.99
408.02
2.57
New Auto [1]
43.24
7260.43
606.38
25.98
328.90
3.41
Achiever [1]
31.71
30.45
503.86
46.63
186.29
0.35
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Difference[0]-[1]
-1.60
3086.16
19.26
-2.09
-142.70
1.51
Difference[0]-[1]
-1.27
1198.82
-17.22
-1.14
-131.08
-1.40
Difference[0]-[1]
1.56
-1882.14
-19.31
2.65
168.06
-0.26
Difference[0]-[1]
1.67
-2396.00
-3.48
1.99
79.93
-0.70
Difference[0]-[1]
-1.96
-3864.00
-5.38
1.45
139.76
-1.38
Difference[0]-[1]
9.76
3549.36
98.53
-19.49
280.68
1.75

T-statistics
[-1.461]
[11.369]***
[3.621]***
[-1.827]*
[-6.886]***
[13.648]***
T-statistics
[-0.688]
[3.04]***
[-1.943]**
[-0.651]
[-3.796]***
[-2.93]***
T-statistics
[0.989]
[-4.167]***
[-2.851]***
[2.148]**
[6.923]***
[-1.665]*
T-statistics
[1.491]
[-5.817]***
[-0.598]
[1.920]**
[3.749]***
[-5.188]***
T-statistics
[-0.854]
[-2.672]***
[-0.473]
[0.476]
[3.054]***
[-3.932]***
T-statistics
[2.842]**
[20.816]***
[5.672]***
[-1.542]
[5.443]***
[18.405]***

loan transactions may require a larger credit score cut-off before being accepted. Personal loans
have a lower credit score than the other loans. Relationship banking may have influenced the
acceptance of this loan application. An achiever loan has the lowest credit score. Credit cards
and personal loans have higher payment delinquency than the other loan types. These loans,
which also have lower charge-off payment (and loan amount), are given more time in
delinquency until marked off the books. Duration is the amount of time that the borrowers paid
off their loan before defaulting. The three auto loan and credit cards loans have higher duration
mean the other loan type. Thus they had more loan payment periods than the other loans.
Using these two dataset, we will attempt to see how and if credit score is a good measure
for default. While some charge-offs are due to the borrower’s death or incarceration, most are
due to bankruptcy, post repo, inability to pay, or just the refusal to pay. In order to run a test to
see whether credit score can really predict the probability of default we need a database that has
both default loans and paid-off loans. In our portfolio loan database we find which loans have
paid of at least 99% of their loans back and we assign the binary variable of 0. We merge them
with our defaulted loans, classified as 1, and delete any default that was due to death, prison, or
any charge-off amount below $50 or have been delinquent in the last 30 days. Our new database
has 1261 observations with 543 being default observations and 718 being paid-off loans. The
credit score ranges from 437 to 850 with a mean of 677. The only shared variable is credit score
and thus our regression will focus on the influence that credit score has as a predictor of
probability of default.
5. Results
Multiple Linear Regression
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The next step of this data analysis is to run a multiple regression analysis on the default
dataset. The main idea of this paper is to find the probability of default. Even though we will not
be able to ascertain this using multiple regression, what this regression analysis will allow us to
do is see if the credit score is a legitimate predictor for charge-off amount. Table 6 shows the
result of our multiple regressions. While we do not know the exact method that companies use to
calculate credit score, at least two variables in our dataset seem to have a positive significance
with credit score, debt ratio and age. We focus our regression on debt ratio and age since these
are characteristics of the borrower opposed to characteristics of loans. Therefore, older
borrowers with lower debt ratio has better credit score. This is logical since older borrowers have
more credit history and have had time to build their credit. Having a high debt ratio is also
synonymous to having high risk, thus it is puzzling why this value is not negative. However the
r-square is very low.
The second regression output is where the dependent variable is the log of charge-off
amount. Credit score is clearly positively significant with charge-off amount in all four equation.
This seems to indicate that borrowers with high credit score has higher charge-off amounts. This
maybe because borrowers with higher credit score are given higher loan amount, thus higher
potential for larger charge-off amounts. However, these equations have a low r-square. The rsquared for regression model four is just 10%. This means the 10% of charge-off amount is
represented by the four predictors that we used in this regression analysis. Ideally, you want to
have an r-squared of at least 50% for a model to be considered legitimate. In conclusion, the rsquared of 10% for this model is extremely low and could not be used to accurately predict
charge-off amount.
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Table 6: Linear Regressions
Multiple regression on the default database. Panel A is a multiple linear regression where the
dependent variable is log(credit score) and the independent variable is log (debt ratio) and
log(age). The p-value is included to show significance. Panel B is a multiple regression where
the log(charge-off amount) is the dependent variable. Different models are run with different
variables, emphasis is on the significance of credit score. R-squared is also recorded.
*** 1% Statistically Significant ** 5% Statistically Significant * 10% Statistically Significant

A. Dependent: Log Credit Score

Constant
logdebtratio
logage
N
R2

Coefficient
2.686
0.028
0.032
578
3.11%

Std.
Error
0.025
0.008
0.014

P-Value
0.001
0.001
0.023

B. Dependent: Log Charge-off amount
(1)
Constant
logcreditscore
logdebtratio
logduration
logage
R2

-6.639***
3.559***

7.16%

(2)
(3)
(4)
6.550*** 5.381*** 5.254***
3.472*** 3.025*** 3.062***
0.111
0.130
0.130
0.259*** 0.262***
-0.145
7.35%
9.74%
9.83%

Discriminant Analysis Results
We run a discriminant analysis on the first dataset. Here are categorical group is good
borrower which is determined by the original risk of the borrower. If they were assigned a B
or better they are classified as good borrower (1), if they have a risk below this than they are
classified as bad borrowers (0). Since there is only two different groups there will only be 1
function. First, we look at how well credit score can preditct good borrowers. Table 7 shows
the outcome and that the discriminant function is significant. However, using just that one
variables comes with misclassifications. Discriminant analysis uses the group means in order
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to discriminate betweens goups. As can be seen in the following table, the group means are
relatively close to each other indicating an overlap in the distribution graph. With an overlap,
this means that there is a higher tendency of classification errors. While this model was able
to correctly classify about 89% of the good borrowers, it had more problems classifying bad
borrowers. This model only classified 16.32% correctly, almost 84% were misclassified in
group 1. Thus using this model, they would place a high porpotion of borrower in good
borrower standing when they really belonged as bad borrower classification.
Table 7: Discriminant Analysis of Good Borrowers based on Credit Score
Discriminant analysis on the group good borrower is run with one predictor, credit score. The first section
of is the canonical test which shows the number of functions and its significance. The second section
looks at unstandardized and standardized canonical coefficient for the discriminant function and the
canonical structure. The next section looks at the group means, the “centroids.” And the last section looks
at the classification. Whether the model is able to classify correctly the type of borrower.
Fcn
1
Ho:

Canon. Corr.
Likelihood Rato
0.103
0.989
this and smaller canon. Corr. Are zero

F
240.06

Unstandardized Standardized
Canonical
Canonical
logcreditscore
constant

1.069
-2.659

Goodborrower

Group Means
-0.176
0.061

0
1
TRUE
Goodborrower
0
1

Classified
0
944
16.32%
1,857
11.15%
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Prob>F
0.000

Canonical
structure

1

1

1
4,841
83.68%
14,804
88.85%

Total
5,785
100%
16,661
100%

We decided to expand the model to include other variables given such as original
balance, current balance, available credit, maturity, and interest rate. As can be seen in table 8,
the function is significant. The unstandardized canonical coefficients are the parameters that are
used to find the discriminant score. Thus the discriminant score for the average borrower is 0.71774, which is much better than the previous model (0.318). The standard canonical
coefficient can be used to rank the importance of the variable. In this case, interest rate definitely
is the most significant predictor.The correlation sturcture are latent discriminant loading
variables. They represents the correlation between the predictor and the discriminant function. It
can also be used to assess the importance of the variable. Usually a variable with a correlation of
.3 or higher is desirable. Interest rate is the only variable that has a high correlation. The group
means, or the centroid, of the group is the average of the sum of all the discriminant score of
each individual of each group. The farther they are apart the better because it will be better able
to descriminate per group. As we can see the group means are relatively far apart and this model
does a much better job of classification. This model correctly classified good borrower by almost
91%. While the bad borrowers are still harder to classify (72%), it is much better than the
previous model. However, 1,621 borrowers were still classified as good borrowers when they
actually were bad borrowers. Therefore, in order to improve this model we need better variables.
As could be seen in standardized canonical coefficient and the canonical structure variables were
relatively low and therefore many of these variables are not the best predictors to use.
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Table 8: Discriminant Analysis of Good Borrowers
Discriminant analysis on the group good borrower is run against several predictors: credit score,
original balance, current balance, available credit, maturity, and interest rate. The first section of
is the canonical test which shows the number of functions and its significance. The second
section looks at unstandardized and standardized canonical coefficient for the discriminant
function and the canonical structure. The next section looks at the group means, the “centroids.”
And the last section looks at the classification. Whether the model is able to classify correctly the
type of borrower.

Fcn
1
Ho:

Canon. Corr.
Likelihood Rato
0.713
0.492
this and smaller canon. Corr. Are zero

F
359.2

Unstandardized Standardized
Canonical
Canonical
logcreditscore
logoriginalbalance
logcurrentbalance
logavailablecredit
logmaturity
intrate
constant

Goodborrower
0
1
TRUE
Goodborrower
0
1

-0.121
0.021
-0.022
-0.210
0.463
0.276
-1.963

Prob>F
0.000

Canonical
structure

-0.113
0.015
-0.025
-0.469
0.172
1.090

-0.102
-0.166
-0.06
-0.129
-0.0073
0.854

1
1,621
28.02%
15,112
90.70%

Total
5,785
100%
16,661
100%

Group Means
1.724
-0.599
Classified
0
4,164
71.98%
1,549
9.30%
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The next test looks at our merged database. This will give us a clearer picture of whether
credit score can predict the probability of default which is shown in Table 9. Since credit score is
our only variable in this database we are constricted in using just this predictor. The function
again is significant and because only one predictor is use the standardized canonical coefficient
and structure is one. The unstandardized canonical coefficient is given in which we are able to
find the discriminant score function: 𝐷𝑖 = −9.99 + 0.015 ∗ 𝑋𝑖 where i is each individual
borrower and x is their credit score. The idea behind the discriminant score is to find the group
means. The group means for paid-off loans is 0.835 and for default loans, -1.104. Credit score is
able to correclty classify loans that will default (be paid-off) by 85% (81%). Thus this model is
relatively good. A manager has a reasonable vindication to assign a cut-off score to avoid
charge-offs. Thus a manager will be willing to accept a credit score which discriminant score is
closer to group mean of 0.835. The group mean’s credit score is approximately a credit score of
722, thus anything above that should clearly be accepted. The average credit score of this
database is a 677, even though the descriminant score is below the group mean, the discriminant
score of .165 is much closer to the group zero’s mean than group one’s mean. Thus a credit score
of 677 should also be accepted.
Notice that there is a big difference in credit score capacity of predicting actual
probability of default and good borrower classification that was given by the bank. While credit
score was able to classify good borrowers relatively well, it was not able to classify bad
borrowers that well. Credit score model tended to over-classify borrowers as good borrowers
where the bank had determined them to be bad borrowers. Thus is can be assumed that managers
uses other variables other than credit score to decide whether a borrower is good or bad. Though
credit score does an admirable job at classifying loans probability of default, there is still room
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for improvement. It still has a 19% probability that it will classify a loan as a pay-off loan when
it actually will default. Depending on the amount of charge-off, this can be a huge loss for any
bank. In order to make this model more accurate, more variables will need to be added in order
for the model to discriminate more efficiently.
Table 9: Probability of Default using discriminant Analysis
Discriminant analysis is run on a merged dataset of defaulted loans and paid-off loans. The
defaulted loans were given the binary value of 0 and the paid off loans were given the binary
number of 1. There is only one predictor value, credit score. The first section of is the canonical
test which shows the number of functions and its significance. The second section looks at
unstandardized and standardized canonical coefficient for the discriminant function and the
canonical structure. The next section looks at the group means, the “centroids.” And the last
section looks at the classification. Whether the model is able to classify correctly the type of
borrower.

Fcn
1
Ho:

Canon. Corr.
Likelihood Rato
0.693
0.52
This and smaller canon. Corr. Are zero

Credit score
constant

Default Loans
0
1
TRUE
Default Loans
0
1

F
1162.8

Prob>F
0.000

Unstandardized
Canonical

Standardized
Canonical

Canonical structure

0.015
-9.99

1

1

1
138
19.22%
464
85.45%

Total
718
100%
543
100%

Group Means
0.835
-1.104
Classified
0
580
80.78%
79
14.55%
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Logistic regression
The credit union ranks their borrowers from an A+ to an E scale, A+ obviously being the
safest borrower. While many banks classify good borrowers based on their credit score alone,
using logistic regression, we can look at other characteristics that can help identify good
borrowers as well. We run eight different regression with varying number of independent
variables to see how that will change the degree of coefficients. The results can be seen in Table
10.
We are first interested in credit score. We want to know how well credit score predicts good
borrowers. One unit increase in log(credit score) will produce an expected increase likelihood
that the individual is a good borrower by .227 units. Because this is a logistic regression we need
to transform coeffieicent to odds ratio which can simply be done by taking the coeeficient’s
exponential. Thus the odds ratio becomes 1.255. Thus each credit score unit increase is
associated with a 25% odds of being a good borrower over a bad borrower. If we wanted to find
the probability of the individual being a good borrower we can plug the coefficients in to the
𝑝

equation: 𝑌 = ln(1−𝑝)= .503+.227*log(creditscore). If we use the mean as our x=609, than the
total will be 1.135. Since we are looking for the probability we will have to transform that
𝑒𝑦

product as well: 𝑝 = (𝑒 𝑦 +1)=75.68% that a borrower with a credit score of 609 is a good
borrower. Thus credit score is a relatively good indicator of borrower status. By adding more
variables however we can be more accurate. Using the coefficient output of equation 6 and the
means of those variables we get a probability of 97% that the average borrower in this bank
portfolio is a good borrower. However, the r-square is still problamatic. Using other variables,
such as borrower’s income and account may make the model fit better and thus increase in
accuracy.
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Table 10: Logistic Regression of Good Borrowers
Logistic regression on active loan dataset. Good borrowers’ variable is a binary variable denoted as 1, and bad borrower is 0. We
check to see how different loan variables influence good borrowers.
prob(𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 log(credit score) + 𝛽2 log(𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) + 𝛽3 log(𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) + 𝛽4 log(𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑙𝑏𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡) +
𝛽5 log(𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦) + 𝛽6 interest rate + +𝛽7 indirect + 𝛽8 coborrow + 𝛽9 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡
*** 1% Statistically Significant ** 5% Statistically Significant * 10% Statistically Significant

logcreditscore

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

0.227***

0.118***
0.443***

0.164***
0.806***
-0.338***

0.391***
1.024***
-0.066**
0.405***

0.449***
0.968***
-0.036
0.390***
0.339***

0.508***
-0.666***
0.100***
0.516***
0.358***
-0.510***

0.508***
-0.756***
0.099***
0.527***
0.351***
-0.516***
0.538***
0.233***

0.503***
0.87%

-0.908***
2.50%

-1.249***
3.38%

-4.035***
9.53%

-4.238***
9.64%

5.993***
49.71%

6.289***
49.94%

0.506***
-0.763***
0.876**
0.526***
0.346***
-0.517
0.652***
0.202***
0.293***
6.257***
50.08%

logoriginalbalance

logcurrentbalance
logavailablecredit
logmaturity
intrate
indirect
coborrow
multiplecredit
constant
Pseudo R

2

Most variables had the expected signs. For example interest rate is negative and credit score
is positive across the board. Good borrowers are characterized as having high credit score which
is used to price loans. Thus, good borrowers will have lower interest rate (cost) than bad
borrowers. Maturity and available credit is also positively significant. Good borrowers are given
a higher available credit because they are trusted to keep up with the payments. Maturity is also
longer. A possible reason for this is that many good borrowers may take out a big loan that
requires a longer time to pay off. Other variables that came in positively significant are indirect
variable, coborrow variable and multiplecredit variable.
An interesting result is that the original balance variable is positively significant with good
borrower until interest rate is taken into account in which it becomes negatively significant. A
possible explanation is that banks are normally more willing for good borrowers to have large
loans. However, since large loans are seen as riskier they tend to have higher interest rates. A
possible solution then is for good borrowers to take multiple smaller loans at lower interest rates.
Current balance also had a change in signs. It started negatively significant but when the maturity
variable was introducted, this switch the sign to positively significant. Since good borrowers tend
to have longer loan maturity than bad borrowers, bad borrowers pay off their balances quicker.
The result of the logistic regression for the default dataset is seen in Table 11 and 12. The
first table categorizes the default borrowers by their credit ranking and uses loan type as the main
independent variables and loan characteristics are used as controle variables; also achievement
loans are excluded to avoid a dummy trap. For borrowers who rank in the A tier, they were more
likely to default on their credit card loans. There is no other statistically significant figure.
Although A credit rating is seen as the best and E is the worse, all of these have failed to pay off
their loans. Thus credit rating does not always signify that the borrower will not default.
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Table 11: Credit Score Ratings and Loan types
Run logistic regression on charge-off dataset. The dependent variables are borrowers who
categorized by credit score ranking where A have the highest credit scores and E has the lowest
credit scores. The independent variables are the different loan types where the characteristic of
loans (italicized) are used as control variables.
[Indicate p-values] *** 1% Statistically Significant ** 5% Statistically Significant * 10% Statistically Significant

Dependent Variable

Credit Card
Personal Loan
New Auto
Used Auto
Indirect
Log(Age)t
Log(Amount)t
Log(Duration)t
Log(Delinquency)t
Constant
N
Pseudo R2

A Tier
(1)

B Tier
(2)

C Tier
(3)

D Tier
(4)

E Tier
(5)

2.059
[0.056]*
1.173
[0.268]
0.380
[.768]
0.480
[0.654]
1.339
[0.214]
0.417
[0.667]
0.469
[0.079]*
0.260
[0.806]
-0.096
[0.806]
-4.942
[0.032]**
571

0.894
[0.301]
0.542
[0.490]
1.375
[0.150]
0.392
[0.633]
0.529
[0.536]

-0.571
[0.386]
-0.263
[0.631]
-0.664
[0.427]
-0.255
[0.652]
-0.110
[0.854]

-0.622
[0.315]
0.188
[0.709]
0.079
[0.910]
0.224
[0.669]
-0.200
[0.720]

-0.661
[0.241]
-0.614
[0.196]
-0.644
[0.420]
-0.175
[0.726]
-0.478
[0.387]

-1.861
[0.060]*
-0.091
[0.691]
0.181
[0.646]
-0.700
[0.035]**
2.575
[0.189]
571

-0.352
[0.677]
0.083
[0.686]
0.241
[0.493]
-0.035
[0.914]
-0.892
[0.605]
571

0.219
[0.760]
0.173
[0.323]
0.022
[0.942]
-0.369
[0.172]
-0.914
[0.535]
571

0.930
[0.227]
-0.458
[0.011]**
-0.418
[0.161]
1.429
[0.001]***
-4.344
[0.009]***
571

4.40%

2.91%

0.52%

1.43%

5.02%

Table 12 classifies the default borrowers by credit type. First we focus on credit score as the
sole predictor. In this case, we are not looking so much at the probability of default since all of
these borrowers have defaulted, but looking at what probability that they defaulted with a
specific loan type. An average borrower with a credit score of 601 is more likely to default on a
personal loan than any other loan (probability of 38%). Credit score seems to be a good predictor
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for personal loans with the expected sign. For indirect and credit card loans however there is a
positive significance which seems to be contrary to common rationality. Credit score was also
insignificant for used and new auto loans.
Table 12: Credit Score Ratings and Loan types
Logistic regression was run on the charge-off dataset from a local credit union. The dependent variable is
the different types of loans and the loan characteristics are the independent variables. Panel A focuses on
credit score, while panel B looks at the other variables as well.
Credit Type = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 log(𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 ) + 𝛽2 log(𝑎𝑔𝑒) + 𝛽3 log(𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡) + 𝛽4 (𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)
+ 𝛽4 (𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦) + 𝛽4 (𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜)
[Indicate p-values] *** 1% Statistically Significant ** 5% Statistically Significant * 10% Statistically Significant

Panel A:
Dependent
Variable
Log(Credit Score)
Constant

Panel B:

N
Pseudo R2

Credit
Card
(1)
6.119

Used
Auto
(2)
1.158

New
Auto
(3)
2.343

[0.057]*

[0.562]

Indirect

Personal

(4)
7.032

(5)
-6.97

[0.631]

[0.006]***

[0.001]***

-19.359

-4.049

-9.788

-21.292

18.862

[0.031]**

[0.466]

0.471

[0.003]

[0.001]***

578
1.05%

578
0.05%

578
0.13%

578
1.53%

578
1.69%

Dependent Variable

Credit Card
(1)

Used Auto
(2)

New Auto
(3)

Indirect
(4)

Personal
(5)

Log(Credit Score)

6.689
[0.068]*
0.194
[0.894]
-0.572
[0.034]**
1.378
[0.004]***
2.841
[0.001]***
0.264
[0.688]
-27.676
[0.007]***
571
8.99%

-3.741
[0.107]
-1.247
[0.109]
0.958
[0.001]***
1.866
[0.001]***
-0.386
[0.158]
-0.078
[0.860]
9.036
[0.154]
571
12.39%

-2.899
[0.633]
1.450
[0.439]
1.423
[0.010]***
2.683
[0.002]***
-0.929
[0.055]*
-0.444
[.716]
-0.485
[0.975]
571
16.32%

3.882
[0.172]
-1.454
[0.137]
1.100
[0.001]***
0.565
[0.152]
-1.14
[0.001]***
-0.716
[0.205]
-10.213
[0.192]
571
11.58%

-0.191
[0.938]
2.053
[0.013]**
-1.116
[0.001]***
-2.959
[0.001]***
1.423
[0.001]***
0.340
[0.448]
-3.401
[0.613]
571
27.26%

Log(Age)t
Log(Amount)t
Log(Duration)t
Log(Delinquency)
Log(debt ratio)
Constant
N
Pseudo R2
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Next we look at all the predictors. Once we put all the other variables, credit score is only
10% statistically significant for credit card loans. Thus credit score is not a very good predictor
for default. This demonstrates that while credit score can be a measure of a borrower’s risk, other
variables should be taken into account when measuring probability of default. Debt ratio is also
insignificant for all five loan types. Even though it may seem logical to assume that a person that
has a low debt ratio, and thus a lower porportion of debt to assets, would be able to pay loan and
thus avoid default, this can not be used as a predictor.

Table 13: Logistic Regression of Probability of Default
Logistic regression on merge data set of default and paid-off loans. The default loans were given
a binary value of 1, while the paid-off loans were given the value of 0. The probability of default
is the dependent variable and credit score is the sole independent variable.
prob(𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 Credit Score
Prob
Credit
Score
Constant
N
Pseudo R2

Coef

Std. Err.

P-Value

-0.024

0.001

0.001

15.923

0.852

0.001

1261
43.37%

The last logistic regression run is on the merge data. The results can be found in table 13.
Credit score variable is negatively significant with a coefficient of -0.024. Thus a one unit
increase in credit score, will produce a .024 decrease likelihood that the loan will default.
Looking at the odds ratio, a one unit increase in credit score is associated with a 2.4% odd of
decrease probability of default. Thus the probability of default of the average credit score
borrower in this dataset (creditscore=677) is 41.9%. Obviously, the higher the credit score the
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less probability of default. An 850 credit score borrower would have a 1.1% chance of default
while a borrower with a 500 credit score would have a 98.1% probability of default. However,
the Pseudo R2 is only 43% so other variable should be taken into account.
Table 14: Result Summary for Probability of Default
Credit
Score

Discriminant Probability
Score
of Default.

500

-2.490

98.1%

592

-1.110

84.7%

663

-0.045

50.3%

667

0.015

47.9%

722

0.840

19.7%

735

1.035

15.2%

786

1.800

5.0%

850

2.760

1.1%

(DS mean)

(DS mean)

The discriminant score mean had a score of 722, which has a 19.7% probability of default. If
a bank want to lower their probability of default they must choose a score that is close to
discriminant score mean, since this function does a good job of classification. The greater the
credit score the lower the probability of default as can be seen in Table 14. This function and
probability of default model however can be improved by adding other variables.

6. Conclusion
Most of the literature related to probability of default has focused on the bond market.
The consumer lending market has been gravely overlooked in research mainly due to data
available. Consumer lending however is a huge market that should not be overlooked. Due to the
recent financial crisis banks have suffered a massive loss on loans. This brings up an awareness
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of a need for an approach that banks can adopt to mitigate these losses and to measure credit risk
more accurately. The objective of this paper is to find a simple model that small bankcs could
use in order to find the probaiblity of default of their loans.
Credit score is a wonderful tool to measure riskiness of a borrower. Using discriminant
analysis and logistic regression we found that credit score is a predictor of default. Using
discriminant analysis a manager could assign a cut-off score that will reduce the likelihood of
default. However, its opaqueness and the fact the borrowers with good score default shows that
it should not be the sole predictor. While the credit score model had passable result in classifying
loans, they still misclassified loans. This error could cause a bank to lose money. The logistic
regression also had a low r-square which also causes question to the accuracy of the model. In
order to have a better predicting model, more variable should be included.

Adding more variables to the model will help in the accuracy of the prediction. This gives
practical use to bankers when making the decision of whether to accept a loan. While credit
score does give good information, it should not be the sole factor when making this decision.
This model can also be used for existing loan. If a bank knows the probability of default of their
existing loan they will be forwarned therefore forearmed in case the worse were to occur. Having
this information is essential for a bank to make the proper credit rationing and capital adequacy
decisions.
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Chapter 2
Essay 2: Christian Mutual Fund Performance
1. Introduction
For centuries, religion has influenced the history of this world and help shape it into what
it is now. Religion is a personal belief that adheres to a supreme authority in which faith is
placed on. It is reasonable to believe that religion also influences a person’s everyday decision.
According to the Huffington post the top 3 beliefs are (1) Christianity with 2.3 billion, (2)
Muslim with 1.5 billion, and (3) nonreligious or atheist with about 1 billion people. According to
the Gallop poll in 2013, 39% of the United States population attend a religious service weekly,
furthermore 56% of the population consider religion very important in their lives (Newport,
2013). This paper seeks to explore the intersection between religion and finance by focusing on
the case of religiously affiliated mutual funds.
Since religion is an important factor when making decisions, there has been an increase
in demand for religious investment. This has brought an increase in popularity for religious
mutual funds. Conventionally, religious mutual funds have been relegated as just another subset
of a group called Socially Responsible Mutual Funds. Socially responsible mutual funds seek to
invest in only those firms that meet their specific criteria. Social Investment Forum defines
“Sustainable and responsible investing (SRI) an investment discipline that considers
environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) criteria to generate long-term competitive
financial returns and positive societal impact.” SRI thus undergoes a rigorous screening process
assuring them that they meet these criteria. In the same manner, religious mutual funds tend to
shy away from investing into “sin stocks” such as alcohol, tobacco, and gambling. Moreover,
Protestant funds tend to avoid investing in industries that promote pornography, abortion, or
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same-sex marriages (Peifer, 2011). Many Catholic funds also avoid industries that are
environmental polluters, that has excessive executive packages, or those that have poor labor
relations. The main question that this paper asks is whether religious mutual funds are different
than SRI funds and how they perform compared to SRI funds and the market. There remains a
doubt on how effective a religious mutual fund would be compared to a regular mutual fund or
market index who is not constrained with eliminating undesirable investment.
Since religious people have an added constraint to their investment choices, mainly that
investment cannot compromise their values, this may affect their diversification value. There has
been an increasing amount of literature that looks at SRI mutual funds’ performance versus a
benchmark and there has even been some research looking into Islamic finance, this paper seeks
to contribute to this area by focusing on Christian mutual funds. The different types of fund that
this paper will look at are: Protestant Funds and Catholic Funds. This paper seeks to separate
Christian funds with social responsible funds and analyze their performance. Christian mutual
funds tend be smaller than SRI as well as have a propensity to screen against moral ambiguous
stocks rather than social or environmental screening. Due to restrictive screening that restrains
diversification benefits, Christian mutual funds performs worse than the market and SRI funds.
They have similar pattern of conventional mutual funds to perform better (compared to the
market) during recession however there performance is still lower than SRI funds. This paper
also seeks to compare Protestant and Catholic funds. There are a larger number of Protestant
funds which also lean towards a larger NAV. On the other hand, Catholic funds take more risk
but have had a greater return historically than Protestant. Also their funds have a higher
percentage of efficiency.
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This paper differs from others that it looks at Christian funds. Past literature related to
this topic has focused on either SRI funds or Islamic funds, none that I am aware of looks
exclusively at Christian funds. Using conventional methods as well as the novel data
envelopment analysis method, this paper will attempt to answer whether Christian mutual funds
are different than SRI funds and if they suffer due to their higher moral standards.

2. Literature Review
July 1774, in Amsterdam an investment trust called Eendragt Maak Magt was created and
established as the first mutual fund (Rouwenhorst, 2004). The first mutual fund invested
primarily in bonds issued to banks, foreign governments and plantation loans to the West Indies.
These Investment Trust were later introduced to the United States in the 1890s. Now there are
more mutual funds in the United States than securities listed in the NYSE. The number of mutual
funds owned by individuals has increased precipitously over the last few decades. Mutual funds
have become a popular tool of investment since it allows the individual investor to pool their
funds with others and thus have a diversified portfolio managed by a professional. According to
the 2012 Census, at the time there were 7,581 mutual funds, in other words, 44 percent of the US
household population owns mutual fund.
Mutual Fund Literature
Mutual funds are considered an attractive investment for the following reasons: customer
service, low transaction cost, diversification and professional management (Gruber, 1996). With
all these appealing qualities, their performance, in many researchers’ observation, is less than
appealing. Malkiel (1995), Gruber (1996), Carhart (1997), and Fama and French (2010) have all
found that mutual funds are not able to outperform passive benchmarks and in most cases
underperform passive indices. Gruber (1996) found that while some managers may augment
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value to funds, the investment cost (transaction cost, fund expenses, and loading fees) charged to
investors eradicates value. Carhart (1997) surmises that while top decile mutual funds perform
well, on average, most funds underperform due to investment expenses. He also disinterred
evidence of a one-year momentum effect. Last year’s winners tend to have higher than average
return the next year, yet this effect discontinues the years after. He surmises that investment costs
have a direct negative effect on funds’ performance.

Mutual funds returns are more enticing

when they are reported in gross terms, before incurring transaction cost and expense ratios.
When measuring in net returns, few are able to produce benchmark returns while covering costs.
Malkiel (1995) however found that mutual fund underperform even before costs are deducted.
Fama and French (2010) stipulates that those few funds that does outperform, only some are due
to managers’ skill oppose to luck.
However, Grinblatt and Titman (1989, 1993) find that superior performance can occur due to
managers’ skill in choosing stocks. They observe over performance specifically among
aggressive-growth and growth type funds as well as with funds with the smallest NAV.
However, their evidence is based on gross returns. Wermers (2000) tries to resolve both sides of
the debate by studying gross equity holdings and net return of mutual funds. He finds that there
is an annual 2.3% difference between net and gross return. The gross returns outperform the
market index by 1.3% a year, and when costs are included, the net fund returns underperform by
1% per year. Of the 2.3% difference, 1.6% can be explained by fund expenses and transaction
costs, while the remaining is due to unproductive fund holding such as bonds and cash. Thus,
while managers can add value with their stock-picking talent, this is neutralized by the cost and
expenses that investors incur.
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On average, most researchers acknowledge that the net return of mutual fund is negative.
However, Glode (2008) and Kosowski (2006) identified precedence where mutual fund have
exceptional performance. They found that while mutual fund does underperform during
expansion periods, during a recession the risk-adjusted performance has been positive. In fact,
fund managers are more active during bad states than good states. The difference between alphas
in recession and expansion periods is about 3-5% per year. Thus, an acceptable elucidation of
investors’ continuance interest in mutual funds is due to their role as insurance against economic
downturns.
Social Responsible Investing
SRI funds comprise only those firms that practice social responsibility such as environmental
policies or charitable donations. This requirement may be a hindrance to firms. Literature shows
two main camps of thought regarding social responsibility. One side argues that engaging in
social responsibility is costly and thus is an economic disadvantage for competitive markets
(Friedman, 1970, McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). They claim that the money used in complying
with social responsibility requisite means sacrificing potential profit making projects and as a
consequence a drop in their potential net income. They strongly argue that the manager’s
primary responsibility is to the shareholders, being “socially responsible” is in fact acting
irresponsibly. Yet it has been stipulated by a second group of researchers that engaging into
social responsibility is actually a competitive advantage since it attracts investors, resources,
quality employees, customers, and creates other unforeseen opportunities (Cochran & Wood,
1984; Waddock & Graves, 1997; Greening & Turban, 2000). Therefore, by engaging in social
responsibility the firms are in essence receiving some good publicity that in the long run will be
beneficial for them.
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Although social responsible investing has grown and it keeps the investors feeling better
about themselves and the work their money is doing; does it perform better than the conventional
mutual funds? There has been a number of papers that look at this topic yet the result still seems
unresolved. Guerard (1997), Diltz (1995), and Hamilton et al. (1993) found that SRI perform as
well as benchmark portfolios. In other words, even though SRI firms had restricted investment,
there is no real benefit to holding an SRI portfolio, but there is no harm either. Statman (2000)
and Bartolomeo & Kurtz (1999), however, found that SRI perform better than normal portfolios.
SRI funds benefit from their intense screening process which effectively eliminates the poor
performing firm’s thus resulting better performance than the benchmark. Yet another group of
researchers found that SRI perform worse than the benchmark (Geczy, Stambough, and Levin
2003). Since SRI investment adds a constraint to the investment choices for their portfolio thus
excluding not only certain stocks, but many times whole industry, this decreases the
diversification benefits of the fund thus explaining the worse performance (Goldreyer and Diltz
1999). Barnett & Saloman (2006) tries to bring these differing views into accordance by
explaining that when a fund undergoes intense screening then it will result in over-performance,
since it eliminates poor firms, on the other hand, if it does very little screening, then it may still
over-perform because their funds tend to exhibit more diversification. Yet those funds that are
stuck in the middle with their screening process does not tend to do well. As can be seen through
literature, these mixed reviews show that the performance of SRI is still unsettled.
Religious Funds
There is another subcategory of the SRI fund, which is the religious funds. Forte & Miglietta
(2007) found that though religious fund are seen as a subcategory of SRI funds they should be
seen as something different. Religious funds or “faith-based funds” show different characteristics
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from SRI funds that are easily distinguishable. Religious funds thus are distinguished by the
values they adhere, there asset allocation, risk, and econometric profile. The investment strategy
of a religious fund then is to not only stay away from “Sin stocks” but to invest in what their
religion holds true. However, Miglietta’s paper uses Islamic funds to define religious funds and
ignores Christian funds all-together.
However both Islamic and Christian funds tend to stay away from “sin” stocks. So how does
neglecting sin stocks effect religious mutual funds? Sin stocks outperform Shariah-compliant
stocks during both expansionary and contractionary economic periods (Liston & Soydemir,
2010). Hong & Kacperczyk (2009) looks at the effects of social norms on the price of sin stocks.
Social norms indicate that normally individuals are against supporting companies that promotes
human vices such as alcohol, tobacco and gaming. They also found evidence that “sin stock” are
held less by institutional ownership and are also not covered much by analyst. Since they are
neglected they tend to be cheaper than their counterpart and thus the market price is below the
intrinsic price. Another reason why “sin stocks” are underpriced is due to litigation risk, these
companies are perceived to be under constant regulatory scrutiny and thus their value is derived
from very conservative accounting. Thus they found statistical significant evidence that sin
stocks have higher expected returns both in the US and European markets.
Recently, many researchers have hone their focus towards Islamic financing and Islamic
mutual funds. Islamic funds differ from conventional funds because they are Sharia-compliant
and thus have limitation to their investment and cannot receive or pay interest (Kraeussl &
Hayat, 2008). Thus they are not only prohibited in investing in companies that are against their
values such as alcohol, gambling, pornography, entertainment and pork related industries but in
addition to these industries they are also prohibited in investing in companies that deal with
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interest payment. Islamic funds tend to prefer small cap firms (Hoepner, Rammal & Rezec,
2009; and Girard & Hassan, 2008). This preference for small-cap is presumptively due to the
reasoning that large cap companies may dabble in Sharia prohibited activities. Khatkhatay &
Nisar (2008) suggests that funds are too liberal with their investment and needs to be more strict
and restrictive of companies allowed to be part of their fund. Rubio, Hassan & Merdad (2012),
Girard & Hassan (2006, 2008), Hussein (2007), and Kraussl & Hayat (2008) found that Islamic
funds do not lose efficiency and are an effective investment opportunity. In other words,
although Islamic fund must adhere to strict Islamic law, there is no difference in performance.
Therefore, Islamic funds are a good alternative for investing while still upholding to Sharia law.
However, Hoepner, Rammal & Rezec (2009) found that Islamic mutual funds trail behind the
benchmark mainly due to its restrictions and prohibition of lucrative investment. Hussein (2007)
finds that Shariah compliant indices underperform in a bear market yet that in a bull market they
are a superior investment choice. However, Kraeussl & Hayat (2008) finds that equity funds tend
to outperform the benchmark during a bear market. Hoepner, Rammal & Rezec (2001) also
studied Islamic mutual funds in twenty different countries. Their finding are that they cannot
determine whether Islamic fund generally under or over-perform, yet that national characteristics
are important to explain fund performance. Interestingly they found that those funds located in
countries where the largest Islamic financial centers were located tended to perform
competitively and even outperform international equity market benchmark. On the other hand,
those funds located in countries with less developed Islamic financial services or where the
predominant religion was Christianity, tended to underperform their benchmark.
While religion in the financial, economic world has been neglected, it has not been all
together ignored. Many researchers have come to the conclusion that religion is an important
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factor in an individual’s decision process. There has been a common misconception that as
science and academic learning advances in today’s culture, then religion will cease to exist, yet
Iannaccone (1998) observes that “the resurgence of evangelical Christians in USA, the rise of
Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East, and the explosive growth of Protestants in Latin
America. In the US, there shows little or no decline of religion over time.” Thus religion is an
important factor in an individual’s decision making and should not be ignored. In fact, Stulz
(2003) uses religion as a prediction of culture. There have been many different philosophies on
religion and economic performance. John Wesley, the founder of the Methodist church, was
inclined to believe that Protestant ethics would bolster up economic development. Arruñada
(2010) finds that “Protestant values shape a type of individual who exerts greater effort in mutual
social control, supports institutions more and more critically is less bound to close circles of
family and friends, and holds more homogenous values.” It has been observed that Protestant
countries tend to have more wealth and power than Catholic nations. One reason is that
Protestant countries have better education (Becker & Woessmann, 2009). Max Weber (1904)
attributes this to Protestant work ethics and their influence in developing capitalism. Protestants
are taught that their hard work glorifies God. United States was founded with this Protestant
work ethics as well. In early colonial times, John Smith admonished the residence of Jamestown
for being idle and only letting the few work hard to maintain them, he thus quoted Paul saying
“he that will not work, shall not eat,” this ideology has continued and become a legacy of
Protestant workers. However, this study does ignore that in many “Protestant” countries,
religiosity is declining (for example European countries). Financial literature ascertains that an
accession of religious participation has a statistically negative effect on economic growth and
reduce individual’s income (Barro & McCleary 2003;McCleary 2008; Lipford & Tollison 2003).
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As individuals are more involved in religious activity they are predisposed to spend less time
working and thus hampers economic development. However, while McCleary makes this case
for several countries, United States is an exception and he also consented that Christian ethics is
important to a child’s upbringing.
Christian ethics are important and useful, McGuire, Omer & Sharp (2011) show that in those
areas where religion is dominant, there are lower incidence of financial reporting irregularities.
There is further indication that religion is apt to make individual and firm more risk averse, thus
the portfolio structure may be more conservative in nature (Hilary & Hui, 2009). Adhikari &
Agrawal (2014) also finds that banks headquartered in highly religious area takes less risk.
Interestingly enough, of the two major Christian factors, Catholics exhibit less aversion to
speculative risk than Protestants (Shu, Sulaeman, & Yeung, 2012). Kumar, Page & Spalt (2011)
also observes this tendency that Catholics have higher pension for gambling and speculation than
Protestants in that regions that have a higher Catholic ratio hold stocks with lottery-type features.
Furthermore, they argue that religious beliefs do influence both individual’s portfolio choice as
well as corporate decisions. Thus it is important to quantify the importance that religion has on
finance. This paper will try to fill in gaps that have not been looked at, mainly in the area of
Christian mutual fund performance.

3. Data
The number of mutual funds owned by individuals has increased precipitously over the last
few decades. Mutual funds have become a popular tool of investment since it allows the
individual investor to pool their funds with others and thus have a diversified portfolio managed
by a professional. According to the 2012 Census, at the time there were 7,581 mutual funds, in
other words, 44% percent of US household population owns mutual fund. A proportion of this
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has been due to the growing number of interest to investing in line with their values. Using
public data, we identify 111 Christian mutual funds and 153 SRI fund that span from January
2005 to January 2015.
Data was collected through publicly available websites. Social Responsible funds were
collected from Social Funds website which is “the largest personal finance site devoted to
socially responsible investing” and the USSIF, the Forum for Sustainable and Responsible
Investment site. The Fama and French factors along with the market return and the risk-free rate
was taken from French’s website. The descriptive statistics of Christian mutual funds and SRI
fund returns are shown in Table 1.
By analyzing the descriptive statistics Social Responsible funds has a higher mean return
than Christian mutual funds but also a larger standard deviation. The table depicts that SRI funds
have a mean of .297% return with a considerably high standard deviation of 4.6%. The SRI fund
fluctuated between a return of -38.6% and 31.3%. The worse return year was at the height of the
financial crisis, 2008, but recovered substantially in 2009. On the other hand, Christian mutual
funds has a statistically significantly lower mean of .15% return with a slightly smaller standard
deviation of 4.3%. While the Christian mutual fund does have a wide range of fluctuation
throughout the 10 years, the minimum return is lower than the Social responsible minimum
return. This intimates that by having higher restrictions, Christian mutual funds are essentially
“shooting themselves in the foot.”
Out of the two Christian sects, Catholic returns seemed to be slightly higher with a .28%
mean return versus Protestant .13% mean return. However Protestant returns does have a slightly
smaller standard deviation. In fact, Catholics have a higher return than the average of the whole
CMF set, while Protestant funds has a lower mean. This seems to suggest that Catholics are
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
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taking more risk in their investment but are having higher rewards compared to Protestants
funds. Data of Thrivent mutual funds have also been collected. Thrivent financial is a Lutheran
financial organization that has the largest Christian fund, however they are not included in the
CMF dataset since they do not actively screen for or against anything. Compared to the other
Protestant funds that does screen, they not only have a higher mean, but also a slightly lower
standard deviation. Thus this seems to agree with the basic concept that more diversification
reduces risk. Comparing the screen dataset versus the S&P 500 index, the returns of both the
Christian mutual funds and Social Responsible funds is lower than the Index and the standard
deviation is higher.
Christian Fund Data
When looking at Christian mutual funds, there are two different subsets: Protestants and
Catholics. Though they have the same origins, the term catholic stems from the idea that there
was one universal church yet that obviously changed with the Protestant movement. These two
sects have a rich history of rivalry and although they have similar origins, there are some
differing theological beliefs. However the Protestant sect also has different denominations that
have different levels of conservatism, for example southern Baptist is known for their
conservative behavior and strictly oppose alcohol, Lutherans, on the other hand, are more
acceptable of the intake of alcohol. This paper will focus on these two sects of Christianity
taking into account they contain different ethical values as well as risk tolerance. The specific
funds that will be looked at are: from the Protestant Family: Praxis fund, New Covenant fund,
Guidestone fund, Steward Fund and Timothy Plan fund. From the Catholic family: Ave Maria
fund, Epiphany funds, and LKCM Aquinas fund.
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Fund Background
Everence Financial service (Praxis) is a ministry of the Mennonite Church USA, started in
1945 which offers many different types of services for individuals, organization and
congregations. Everence screening process adheres to their stewardship investing core values:
respect, build, demonstrate, exhibit, support, and practice. Everence thus invests in companies
that respect human right, ethnic and cultural diversity. They shun any company that promotes
violence, such as weapons production and military contracting. They invest in countries that
conduct in equal opportunity and fair compensation to their employees as well as companies that
have sound corporate governance. They also positively screen those companies that support and
develop their communities with their own resources. And lastly, they invest in companies that
promote natural and environmental welfare.
New Covenant Funds are a part of the Presbyterian foundation group that makes their
investment decisions which are consistent with views adopted by the General Assembly of the
Presbyterian Church. The screening process avoids the gambling, alcohol and firearm industry.
They also have positive screening for companies that hold fair treatment to employees and
invests in their communities. However New Covenant does make a note that they may at times
invest in companies that has been recognized as being in conflict with the principles held by the
Presbyterian Church.
Guidestone, founded August 2001, belongs to the Southern Baptist denomination and is
United States’ largest screened Christian fund. This fund is much more socially conservative
than the last few funds. Their goal is to provide high-quality, comprehensive mutual fund for
individuals, foundations, retirement and other investment causes while adhering to their
Christian values. They have an intense screening process against those companies that deals with
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liquor, tobacco, gambling, pornography, the abortion industries or any company who are
irreconcilable to the Christian moral and ethics that Guidestone adopts.
Steward mutual fund is a non-denominational Christian fund that tries to remain consistent
with their Christian faith. They only execute avoidance screening and thus do not have any
positive screening, which promotes a typical Christian culture. The negative screening they apply
is against abortion, alcohol, gambling, tobacco and pornography industries or those companies
that derive significant income from these products.
The Timothy Fund was begun in 1992 by Arthur Ally. His purpose was to implement a fund
that will more properly screen based on Christian value. Their goal is to be good stewards of
what God has entrusted them. They mainly screen against 7 activities: abortion, pornography,
entertainment that promotes violence and sexual immorality, alternative lifestyle, alcohol,
tobacco and gambling.
The Ave Maria mutual fund is the most prominent catholic-oriented mutual fund. They hire
Schwartz Investment Counsel, Inc. as adviser for their mutual fund. Their mission is to provide
superior financial services while keeping with the Catholic teachings. Ave Maria holds on to a
pro-life, pro-family philosophy. Their moral screening identifies companies and determines
whether they are compliant towards the Catholic Church’s values. These values mostly regard
teachings on abortion, pornography, and policies that undermine the holy sacrament of marriage.
The Epiphany Fund is a Catholic fund which seeks to invest in securities that are consistent
with Christian morals and ethical principles. They use the FFV scorecard (Faith and Family
Values) to screen their investments. The objective of the FFV scorecard is to identify companies
that are in keeping of their 4 pillars: 1) Life and Family; 2) Social Justice; 3) Environment; and
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4) Corporate Governance. Their screening is consistent with the United States Conference of
Catholic Bishops (USCCB) Socially Responsible Investment guidelines.
Luther King Capital Management (LKCM) Aquinas was founded in 1979 as an advisory firm
committed to select equity based on Catholic values. There are committed in providing a solid
financial performance while keeping in line with the Catholic values. They also follow the
investment guidelines set by the USCCB investment guidelines. They screen against companies
that engage in abortion, embryonic stem cell research and weapons of mass destruction. Along
with this moral screening they also screen against companies that have poor environmental,
human right records and employment records. This fund, however not only screens against
companies, but also take a proactive stand discussing with companies about their practices that
may come into conflict with their guidelines.
So while there is an obvious difference between Islamic funds and SRI funds do to not only
restriction in “sin stocks, Islamic funds are very different because they restrict interest-bearing
stocks. However these are questions on whether Christian funds are different than SRI funds.
Both type of funds have similar screening quality which is why Christian funds have been
categorized as a SRI funds. However, there Screening focus is different which impacts fund
composition. As can be seen from table 2, CMF and SRI funds have different focus when it
comes to screening. 93% of SRI funds have some sort of environmental screening. The second
most popular screen is social screening. Social screening is a very broad subject that relates to
anything that involves the improvement of society such as, but not limited to, community
investment, human rights, and labor issues. On the other hand, they do not emphasize moral-type
screening like abortion (only 1%) and pornography (6%). Christian mutual funds on the other
hand accentuate the need to screen based on these issues that are very important to their faith,
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such as screening against pornography and abortion (96%). Another category that is also
screening against by both CMF (83%) and SRI (69%) funds is the traditional exclusionary
screens such as tobacco, alcohol, and gambling. Thus there is an obvious difference in screening
emphasis on Christian mutual funds and SRI funds. An interesting matter to note is that 100% of
the protestant funds execute traditional exclusionary screening process, while none of the
Catholic funds do.
Table 2: Qualitative Screening
The data includes 108 Social Responsible Funds, and 106 Christian mutual funds. The information was
collected from the fund family website or through the Social Investment fund forum. This table classifies
what type of screening funds emphasizes on.

Thus, at least qualitatively, we see a difference in screening undertaken by Christians
compared to SRI funds through their screening process. Also according to the descriptive
statistics Christian mutual funds has a lower standard deviation and thus their fund has lower
risk. Thus values have an impact on screening which has an impact on fund composition and
performance.
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4. Methodology
Existing literature poses questions while analyzing Christian mutual funds. How does Christian
mutual fund perform compared to the market? Is there a difference in performance during
recessions as indicated by literature? Is Christian mutual fund performance different than SRI
funds? How do Catholic and Protestant fund perform? We will be using traditional methods used
in past literature to evaluate and compare performance.
Sharpe Ratio
When comparing performance of mutual funds, two popular ratios are the Sharpe ratio
(1966) and Treynor ratio (1965). These two ratios are similar in theory and practice. The
numerator is calculated by finding the excess return, the portfolio return subtracted by the risk
free rate, divided by the standard deviation.
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = (𝑅𝑝 − 𝑅𝑓 )/𝜎

(1)

where 𝑅𝑝 the return of the portfolio is, 𝑅𝑓 is the return of a risk-free asset, and 𝜎 is the standard
deviation of the portfolio. Thus the Sharpe ratio calculates the excess return per unit of risk. The
higher the Sharpe ratio the better since it indicates that the portfolio has performed well relative
to the risk. However, if this ratio becomes negative it indicates that the investment in the
portfolio is not worth the risk thus a risk-less alternative is preferable.
Sharpe (1994) details the importance of defining the differential return. 𝐷𝑡 = 𝑅𝐹𝑡 − 𝑅𝐵𝑡 .
He denotes that the differential return in period t is equal to the difference of the return on the
fund in period t, 𝑅𝐹𝑡 , and the return on the benchmark portfolio in period t, 𝑅𝐵𝑡 , (in this analysis
we will use both the risk free rate as well as the S&P 500 Index as the benchmark). The ex post
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̅
𝐷

̅ is the average value of the differential return. The
Sharpe Ratio than becomes 𝑆ℎ = 𝜎 , where 𝐷
𝐷

T-statistic can easily be found to measure the significance of the Sharpe Ratio: T-stat= 𝑆ℎ ∗ √𝑡.
Jensen’s alpha and CAPM
Another customary measure used is the Jensen’s alpha (1968).
Jensen’s alpha = ∝ = 𝑅𝑝 − [𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝑓 )]

(2)

where 𝑅𝑝 the return of the portfolio is, 𝑅𝑓 is the return of a risk-free asset, and 𝑅𝑀 is the market
return. This is another performance measure that presents the abnormal return of portfolio over
the theoretical expected return given by the capital asset pricing model. Jensen’s alpha is thus
calculated by the capital asset pricing model (CAPM):
(𝑅𝑝 − 𝑅𝑓 ) = ∝ +𝛽(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝑓 )

(3)

The alpha in this model is the y-axis intercept of the excess return and thus signify a type of
active return. If the value is positive, then it signifies that the portfolio is earning an excess return
thus outperforming the benchmark. Thus a positive alpha is positive news since it indicates that
the portfolio “beats the market.”
Fama-French Factor model
While our focus remain on alpha as a measurement of performance, the Fama – French
three factor model and the Carhart four-factor model are calculated in order to test for
robustness. Therefore, we want to know to know the significance of alpha controlling for the
additional risk factors and momentum.
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The Fama and French (1993) three factor model is an extension of the CAPM model:
(𝑅𝑝 − 𝑅𝑓 ) = ∝ +𝛽𝑖,1,𝑡 (𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 ) + 𝛽𝑆,𝑖, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻,𝑖 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡

(4)

where (𝑅𝑝 - 𝑅𝑓 ) is the excess return of the portfolio , (𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 ) is the excess return of the
market which is measure using the value-weighted return of firms listed in CRSP as the return on
market minus the one-month Treasury bill rate. The 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 variable is Fama and French’s “small
minus big” factor which is a size loading factor and takes the three smallest portfolio minus the
three biggest portfolio. HML is the “high minus low” factor which is a value loading factor that
takes two value portfolio and subtract it by two growth portfolios.
We will also use Carhart four-factor model, which is an extended version of the FamaFrench three factor model and includes a momentum factor.
(𝑅𝑝 − 𝑅𝑓 ) = ∝ +𝛽𝑖,1,𝑡 (𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 ) + 𝛽𝑆,𝑖, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻,𝑖 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑀,𝑖 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡

(5)

The momentum factor, 𝑀𝑂𝑀, is calculated using six value-weighted portfolio which
were creased based on size and prior returns that are listed in the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ.
Than to find the MOM, the two lowest prior average return portfolio is subtracted from the two
highest prior average return portfolios. This factor measure if the fund experiences momentum,
which is if the price continues experience the same trend as the previous periods.
Data Envelopment Analysis
While these traditional ratios and methodology are useful, another method is used to
accurately measure performance of mutual fund and take account of the ethical aspect that our
funds possess. Thus the performance that is used here and which have been used in other mutual
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fund related literature (such as Basso and Funari 2001, 2003; Rubio et al. 2014) is the Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach. The DEA model is beneficial because it can use
multiple inputs and outputs to measure the relative performance of the decision making unit. The
DEA is a popular operational management methodology that tests the efficiency of decision
making. The premise of this methodology is to compare a producer’s (or a decision making unit,
DMU) efficiency with the “best” producer (or the efficient frontier). Thus the produces takes on
a set of inputs to produce a set of outputs. An efficient decision maker thus would seek to
maximize output while minimizing input. In the investment environment this would be similar to
maximizing return while minimizing risk. While there is a number of way to formulate the DEA
the most direct formulation will be given: were 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of inputs that produces a vector of
outputs, 𝑌𝑖 , where i is the number of funds. Therefore to measure the efficiency of DMU0 , by
estimating the performance, P, fund the following linear program would be used:
𝑃 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝜃
𝑠. 𝑡. ∑ 𝜆𝑖 𝑋𝑖 ≤ 𝜃 𝑋0

(6)

∑ 𝜆𝑖 𝑌𝑖 ≥ 𝑌0
𝜆≥0
where λ is the exogenous weight fitted to DMU i in its attempt to dominate DMU0 which
efficiency is represented by θ. Thus when P=1, then they have reach efficiency level.
In this DEA model, input will represent a risk measure while output will represent all
return measurements. The literature proposes 3 different feasible input for risk: standard
deviation, lower partial moments (LPM), and maximum drawdown periods (MDP). The proposal
for outputs are: expected returns, the upper partial moments (UPM), and the maximum
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consecutive gain (MCG). LPM demonstrates the risk of holding an investment security while
UPMs captures the gains of holding the investment. This study utilizes partial movements to
differentiate between inputs and outputs. In order to estimate both the lower and upper partial
moments as the mth root of these variables, the mean return, rmin, is employed to distinguish
between the upside and downside of investment.
𝑇̃

𝐿𝑃𝑀𝑗.𝑚

1
= ∑(𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛 − 𝑟𝑡,𝑗 )𝑚
𝑇
𝑡=1

(7)

𝑇̂

𝑈𝑃𝑀𝑗.𝑚

1
= ∑(𝑟̅𝑡,𝑗 − 𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛 )𝑚
𝑇

∀ 𝑚 = 0, … ,4

𝑡=1

Where 𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛 is the target rate, 𝑟𝑡,𝑗 is the monthly return of fund j that is below the target rate, 𝑟̅𝑡,𝑗
is the monthly return of fund j that is above the target rate. Utilizing partial movements, BBC is
found to determine how efficiently funds take risk to produce return. These scores are than used
to compare with the average of their own fund category.
MDP and MCG can also be used if Net Present Value (NPV) of the funds are available. Funds
j’s MDP represents the maximum number of consecutive months when the fund’s net asset value
is lower than the historic high. Conversely, MCG is when the maximum number of consecutive
months are above the minimum target rate.
Using old traditional methods and a newer efficient method we can study the
performance of SRI funds as well as Christian mutual funds.

5. Results
Sharpe Ratio
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Table 3 shows the Sharpe ratio when the differential benchmark is either the risk-free rate
or the S&P 500 index. Social Responsible Mutual funds has a positive Sharpe ratio when
comparing with risk free rate which is statistically significant in the 1% level. SRI funds has an
average excess return of 4.6% per unit of risk. Catholic mutual funds’ Sharpe ratio is significant
in the 10% level. Catholic funds has an average excess return of 4.8% per unit of risk. The
Sharpe Ratio calculated for the comprehensive Christian mutual fund data set and that of the
Protestant mutual funds are statistically insignificant. Thus while Social Responsible funds and
Catholic funds returns are more volatile, they tend to be compensated for the extra risk they bare.
The Sharpe ratio for all funds using the S&P 500 index as the benchmark are all
negatively significant in the 1% level. Thus passive investing and simply following the S&P 500
index seems to be a better investment choice. During the Financial Crisis, however, the Sharpe
ratio calculation tells a different story. In 2008, the Sharpe ratio for all four funds are positively
significant in the 1% level compared to the S&P 500 Index. The comprehensive Christian mutual
fund gets compensated with almost 16% excess return per unit of risk, while the Social
Responsible funds has a 12% excess return per unit of risk. Thus even though SRI funds held
more risk they did not get compensated as well as the Christian mutual funds. However, SRI
funds were the only funds that continued to receive compensation in 2009. Thus, in 2008 at the
beginning of the Financial Crisis, the screened funds performed better than the market, yet it
would have been a better investment choice to go with a risk-free asset. In 2009, after the peak of
the Financial Crisis and due to the government borrowing and intervention, the funds became a
better investment opportunity than the risk free market. In 2014, these two types of screened
mutual funds are not deemed as good investment for the risk they take compared to both the riskfree asset and the S&P.
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Table 3: Sharpe Ratio
The Sharpe ratio for Christian Mutual funds and Social Responsible mutual funds is used to compare the
performance of mutual funds to the risk-free asset, one-month Treasury bill rate, and the market, S&P 500
Index.

𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = (𝑅𝑝 − 𝑅𝑓 )/𝜎
The Sharpe ratio calculates the excess return per unit of risk. This comparison is done throughout the
entire sample as well as by year. The t-statistics has also been calculated.
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Jensen’s Alpha
Table 4 demonstrates the result for Jensen’s Alpha. SRI funds underperforms the market
by .3868 basis points, which is approximately a -4.64% underperformance after adjusting for
systematic risk. Christian mutual funds also underperforms, but by .46 basis points, this is
approximately a -5.52% underperformance. In fact, all four funds have a statistically negative
alpha and a beta less than 1. Thus although these funds had lower risk than the market’s beta,
they still underperformed the market. Of the four funds, SRI funds was slightly less negative. In
fact SRI is statistically significantly higher than Christian mutual funds in 5% level. Protestant
and Catholic funds have similar returns, with Catholic funds having a higher market risk
however the difference is not statistically significant. This model has decent r-square ranging
from 57%-68%, thus does a fairly good job in predicting the variation of the returns using just
these two variables. Panel B presents the fund’s alpha per year. Here we find interesting results
during the Great Recession. SRI funds performed similar to the market in 2008, but outperform
the market slightly in 2009 with a .38 basis point increase per month, or a 4.6% annual increase.
While the comprehensive Christian mutual fund did not outperform the market any year,
Catholic funds outperform the market in 2008 with an excessive .69 basis points per month and
performed as well as the market in 2009 and 2010. In 2008, they definitely outperform the
Protestant fund However, in the overall data, Catholics had the worst alpha and the highest beta.
Thus, Catholic funds tend to take more risk, and while it paid off during the financial crisis, in
recent years this has not been the case. In 2014, they statistically significantly (in 5% level)
performed worse than Protestant funds.
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Table 4: Jensen’s Alpha
Jensen’s alpha measure the abnormal return of the portfolio.

Jensen’s alpha = ∝ = 𝑅𝑝 − [𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝑓 )]
Where 𝑅𝑝 is the portfolio return, 𝑅𝑓 is the risk-free rate, and 𝑅𝑀 is the return of the market. The
alpha coefficient represents the abnormal performance of the fund, while beta of the excess
return is systematic risk. Panel A runs the regression for the entire data set, while Panel B runs
the data for each individual year.
*** 1% Statistically Significant
** 5% Statistically Significant
* 10% Statistically Significant

Panel A: For Entire Data
Alpha
Rm-Rf
R-square

SRI
-0.3868***
0.8394***
63.58%

CMF
-0.4605***
0.7595***
58.77%

Protestant
-0.4619***
0.7452***
57.30%

Catholic
-0.4661***
0.8482***
67.96%

CMF
-0.2930***
-0.7422***
-0.5846***
-0.2486*
0.1736
0.0378
-0.2546***
-0.2752***
-0.9992***
-0.9870***

Protestant
-0.2956***
-0.7750***
-0.5857***
-0.3809***
0.1691
0.0231
-0.2922***
-0.2417***
-0.9578***
-0.9099***

Catholic
-0.2821
-0.5223**
-0.5784***
0.6939**
0.2014
0.1142
-0.0531
-0.4248***
-1.2000***
-1.3851***

Panel B: Alpha per Year
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014

SRI
-0.3138***
-0.4605***
-0.3316***
0.0572
0.3846***
-0.2309***
-0.5347***
-0.2410***
-0.6199***
-0.8241***

Fama-French and Carhart
The Fama-French three factor model, as seen in table 5, and the Carhart model, table 6,
are performed for robustness. The r-square did slightly increase although not as much as
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Table 5: Fama and French Three Factors
The Fama-French three factor model captures performance of the fund through alpha and
systematic risk, but also looks at additional risk involved with size and value.
(𝑅𝑝 − 𝑅𝑓 ) = ∝ +𝛽𝑖,1,𝑡 (𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 ) + 𝛽𝑆,𝑖, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻,𝑖 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡
where (𝑅𝑝 - 𝑅𝑓 ) is the excess return of the portfolio , (𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 ) is the excess return of the
market, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 variable is Fama and French’s “small minus big” factor, HML is the “high minus
low” factor. The regression is run on the whole sample as well as individual years for the Social
Responsible funds (SRI), Christian mutual funds (CMF), and the Protestant and Catholic sects.
The bottom reflects r-square.
*** 1% Statistically Significant
** 5% Statistically Significant
* 10% Statistically Significant
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conveyed by Fama and French. When the Fama and French size and value factors are included,
the underperformance observed in the Jensen’s alpha is only aggravated more. SRI (Christian)
funds underperform the market by .43 (.47) basis points per month, -4.8% (.65%) annually.
Again, the alphas are all negative and significant while the betas are all less than one and also
significant when looking at the whole sample date. This result is similar to mutual fund
performance against the market. In 2008, the alphas cease to be significant, the market betas are
significant and still lower than one, though they are higher than other years. So while they still
had less market risk than the market portfolio, their funds had more market risk than previous
years. In 2009, only the SRI funds intercept coefficient was significant in the 5% level. As in the
Jensen’s alpha case, the alpha is positively significant thus they outperform the market by .2564
basis points per month. This seems to support early literature that mutual funds perform better
than the market during economic downturns. However this was short lived since in 2010, the
alpha again became negatively significant. During the financial crisis, the alpha for the
remaining funds remained insignificant. Thus from 2008-2010, Christian funds performed no
better or worse than the market.
While both SRI and CMF have negative alphas, in most cases CMF exhibited an inferior
alpha (statistically significant in 10% level). In fact, SRI has a superior performance to the
separate Christian funds as well. This pattern remain in each individual year. This seems to
indicate that the extra pressure of religious screening hurts the performance of religious funds.
When dividing the Christian funds between Protestant and Catholic, at first glance, it seems that
Catholics have performed better than Protestants even though they tend to involve more risk.
However, when studying each individual year, the difference of the coefficients are only
statistically significant (5% level) in 2007. As indicated by the Jensen’s alpha, in 2014 Protestant
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funds perform better than Catholic funds (statistically significant in 10% level). In other words,
since 2012 Catholics have had the more negative alpha while still having the larger beta. Thus
the Catholic funds have taken on more risk and it has only made their performance worse.
The coefficient for size premium are positive for SRI and Catholic funds. These funds
had higher risk with a positive SMB coefficient indicates that they invest in small market equity
portfolio. The slightly more conservative Protestant funds has a negative SMB coefficient. Thus
as firm size increases, the SMB coefficient decreases. The SMB value would decrease and thus
lower the funds return. Historically, the SMB factors have received a size premium of about
3.3%, yet in recent years due to financial turmoil this size premium has significantly decrease. In
2008, at the height of the financial crisis, the SMB coefficient for SRI and Catholic funds have
become insignificant, while the CMF and Protestant SMB funds have become more negative.
Protestant fund tend to gravitate more to large cap firms during crisis since they tend to perform
better. The HML coefficient for SRI and Christian mutual funds are also negative and
significant. Thus as equity firms have higher book-to-market value, it will have a lower
coefficient. This seems to indicate that growth stocks outperform value stocks during the extant
of this period.
Table 6 demonstrates the result of Carhart four factor model. Again, the r-square is only
slightly higher than before. Thus even for controlling for momentum the alphas are negatively
significant. The momentum factor is negatively significant in all funds signifying an absence of
the momentum effect articulated in other research. This seems to indicate mean reversion. All
the alphas are negatively significant for the whole sample period. Christian mutual funds perform
worse than SRI funds, and Catholic funds perform better than Protestant funds. During the
Financial Crisis alphas become insignificant. Even though alphas are no longer significant with
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Table 6: Carhart Four Factor Model
Carhart is an extension of the Fama-French three-factor model to include the momentum factor.
(𝑅𝑝 − 𝑅𝑓 ) = ∝ +𝛽𝑖,1,𝑡 (𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 ) + 𝛽𝑆,𝑖, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻,𝑖 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑀,𝑖 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡
where (𝑅𝑝 - 𝑅𝑓 ) is the excess return of the portfolio , (𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 ) is the excess return of the
market, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 variable is Fama and French’s “small minus big” factor, HML is the “high minus
low” factor, and MOM is the momentum factor. The regression is run on the whole sample as
well as individual years for the Social Responsible funds (SRI), Christian mutual funds (CMF),
and the Protestant and Catholic sects. The bottom reflects r-square.
*** 1% Statistically Significant
** 5% Statistically Significant
* 10% Statistically Significant
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the extra momentum factor, the evidence point out that they at least perform similarly to the
market. The r-square is also the greatest during these times. The same performance trend is
shown in recent years. While SRI continues to outperform the religious funds, Catholic have
perform worse than Protestant funds.
Data Envelopment Analysis
The DEA was performed based on three years’ worth of data which made some funds
invalid to find the estimated monthly BCC scores. These scores are than averaged out and
compared the group average. The objective of this analysis is to measure the relative efficiency
of each fund compared to other funds in the same group. Table 7 depicts the number of funds
that are efficient. As can be seen from the result, Catholic funds are the most efficient. About
half of the Catholic funds are efficient. Of course this result may be skewed by the lack of
number of valid funds. Comparing Social responsible funds and Christian mutual funds, Social
responsible funds are exceedingly more efficient than Christian mutual funds. About 44% of SRI
funds are efficient compared to 37% of Christian mutual funds. However, this still indicates that
the majority of funds have shown an inefficient BCC score (62 of 140 funds). This is consistent
with finding previous findings. Screening funds have hurt performance and efficiency.
Furthermore, while Christian mutual funds, as a group, are less efficient than SRI funds this is
mostly contributed to the larger number of protestant funds. Catholic funds, who tend to perform
better than their Protestant counterpart, are also seen to be more efficient.
There are a number of funds that have 1 as their BBC score for several months. The
Protestant fund that has the most months with a BBC score of fund is the Guidestone Low
Duration bond funds. In fact, many of the higher BBC rated funds are conservative in nature
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either focusing on bonds, income funds or conservative allocation type funds. While the Catholic
funds have higher proportion of efficiency, the number of funds are less along with the number
of months. The bond which has a BBC score of 1 for most months is the Epiphany FF Strategic
Income. However, true to the Catholic’s fund characteristic, the other funds are not as
conservative as that of Protestant, the efficient funds are small cap, value funds and growth
funds. SRI funds who has a measure of 1 BBC score also lean towards conservative investment.
The fund which scored the most 1 as there BBC score is the Access Capital Community
Investment which is an intermediate Government bond fund. Thus the DEA method tells us that
while the Catholic have a greater proportion of efficient funds, mainly efficient funds tend to
lean toward conservative investment.

Table 7: Data Envelopment Analysis
The Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) measure the efficiency of fund’s performance by
comparing the funds inputs and output. To measure the efficiency of the decision making unit
they try to maximize return by minimizing risk. This study utilizes partial movements to
differentiate between inputs and outputs to calculate BBC Score. In order to calculate BBC,
funds need to have at least 3 years of information. The average of efficiency scores are found for
each fund type and below shows the percentage of funds that are above the average efficiency
score.
Fund Type
CATH
CMF
PROT
SRI

Number of Valid Funds
15
98
83
140

Above Average
8
36
33
62
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Percentage
53.33%
36.73%
39.76%
44.29%

6. Conclusion
While religion was the first to screen their investment, they have now been swallowed up
into a general category along with other “social responsible” investing. However, while what
was deemed socially responsible by the public at one time was seen synonymous to Christian
values, this is obviously not the case now. While SRI funds invest heavily in environmentally
friendly and social awareness funds, Christians have taken another path to focus on investing
based on biblical principles. Christian funds are more concerned with staying away from moral
issues such as abortion, pornography, and emphasizes on staying true to biblical truth or follow
guidelines submitted by higher authority of the church. Therefore, I argue that just as Islamic
funds are being seen as separate from SRI grouping, so should Christian funds.
According to the DEA method, these screened funds are not highly efficient. In most
cases, less than half of the fund exceed the average mark of its group. Furthermore, SRI fund and
Christian funds tend to perform worse than the market during normal economic times. However,
during recession screened mutual funds performed as well and in times better than the market.
This follows literature which determines that mutual funds are attractive as an insurance
mechanism during market downturns. Christian mutual funds performed worse than SRI funds.
This may suggest that their lower NAV and their exclusionary screening in “sin stocks” and
moral ambiguous stocks neutralizes diversification benefits and results in lower returns than even
SRI funds.
This research was limited by data provided and results could be improved with a more
detail and comprehensive dataset. Yet the results have proven interesting. We have showed that
moral screening has an effect on result. As literature suggest, Catholics tend to take more risk
than Protestants and in many cases taking extra risk paid off. In fact, Catholic funds are the most
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efficient subset funds. In many cases, Christian organizations invest in Christian funds in their
retirement fund. This information should be useful to them. While they may be abstain from
sinful investing and maintain their moral principles, this in fact may hurt them financially.

83

7. Reference
Adhikari, B., & Agrawal, A. (2014). Does Local Religiosity Matter for Bank Risk-Taking?
Available at SSRN 2465052.
"America's Largest Family of Catholic Mutual Funds." Home: Ave Maria Mutual Funds.
Schwartz Investment Councel Inc., 2014. Web. 21 Aug. 2014.
Arruñada, Benito. (2010). "Protestants and Catholics: Similar Work Ethic, Different Social
Ethic*." The Economic Journal 120.547 890-918.
Barnett, Michael L., and Robert M. Salomon. (2006). "Beyond dichotomy: The curvilinear
relationship between social responsibility and financial performance." Strategic
Management Journal 27.11 1101-1122.
Barro, R. J., & McCleary, R. (2003). Religion and economic growth (No. w9682). National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Basso, A., & Funari, S. (2001). A data envelopment analysis approach to measure the mutual
fund performance. European Journal of Operational Research, 135(3), 477-492.
Basso, A., & Funari, S. (2003). Measuring the performance of ethical mutual funds: a DEA
approach. Journal of the operational research society, 54(5), 521-531.
Becker, Sascha O., Ludger Woessmann (2009). Was Weber Wrong? A Human Capital Theory of
Protestant Economic History. Quarterly Journal of Economics124 (2): 531-596.
Carhart, M. M. (1997). On persistence in mutual fund performance. The Journal of finance,
52(1), 57-82.
Cochran, Philip L., and Robert A. Wood. (1984). "Corporate social responsibility and financial
performance." Academy of management Journal 27.1 42-56.
DiBartolomeo, Dan, and Lloyd Kurtz. (1999). "Managing risk exposures of socially screened
portfolios." Northfield Information Services 1-17.
David Diltz, J. (1995). "The private cost of socially responsible investing." Applied Financial
Economics 5.2 69-77.
Elfakhani, Said, and M. Kabir Hassan. "Performance of Islamic mutual funds." Economic
Research Forum, 12th Annual Conference. 2005.
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French. (1993). "Common risk factors in the returns on stocks
and bonds." Journal of financial economics 33.1 3-56.

84

Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth French. (2008). "Mutual fund performance." Journal of Finance
63 389-416.
Forte, Gianfranco, and Federica Miglietta. (2007). "Islamic mutual funds as faith-based funds in
a socially responsible context."
Friedman, Howard Steven. "5 Religions With The Most Followers." The Huffington Post.
TheHuffingtonPost.com, 25 Apr. 2011. Web. 14 May 2014.
Friedman, Milton. (1973)."The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits." New
York
Geczy, Christopher C., Robert F. Stambaugh, and David Levin. (2003). Investing in socially
responsible mutual funds. Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research, The Wharton
School, University of Pennsylvania.
Goldreyer, Elizabeth F., and J. David Diltz. (1999). "The performance of socially responsible
mutual funds: incorporating sociopolitical information in portfolio selection." Managerial
Finance 25.1 23-36.
Greening, Daniel W., and Daniel B. Turban. (2000)."Corporate social performance as a
competitive advantage in attracting a quality workforce." Business & Society 254-280.
Guerard Jr, John B. (1997). "Is there a cost to being socially responsible in investing?." The
Journal of Investing 6.2 11-18.
Hamilton, Sally, Hoje Jo, and Meir Statman. (1993). "Doing well while doing good? The
investment performance of socially responsible mutual funds." Financial Analysts
Journal 62-66.
Hilary, Gilles, and Kai Wai Hui. (2009). "Does religion matter in corporate decision making in
America?." Journal of Financial Economics 93.3 455-473.
Hoepner, Andreas GF, Hussain G. Rammal, and Michael Rezec. (2011). "Islamic mutual funds’
financial performance and international investment style: evidence from 20 countries."
The European Journal of Finance 17.9-10 829-850.
Iannaccone, L. R. (1998). Introduction to the Economics of Religion. Journal of economic
literature, 1465-1495.
Jegadeesh, N., & Titman, S. (1993). Returns to buying winners and selling losers: Implications
for stock market efficiency. The Journal of Finance, 48(1), 65-91.
Jensen, Michael C. (1968). "The performance of mutual funds in the period 1945–1964." The
Journal of finance 23.2 389-416.
85

Kumar, A., Page, J. K., & Spalt, O. G. (2011). Religious beliefs, gambling attitudes, and
financial market outcomes. Journal of Financial Economics, 102(3), 671-708.
Lipford, J. W., & Tollison, R. D. (2003). Religious participation and income. Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization, 51(2), 249-260.
"LKCM Aquinas Funds." LKCM Aquinas Funds. Quasar Distributors, LLC., 2014. Web.
McCleary, R. M. (2008). Religion and economic development. Policy Review, 148, 45-57.
McGuire, S. T., Omer, T. C., & Sharp, N. Y. (2011). The impact of religion on financial
reporting irregularities. The Accounting Review, 87(2), 645-673.
McWilliams, Abagail, and Donald Siegel. (1997). "The Role of Money Managers in Assessing
Corporate Social Reponsibility Research." The Journal of Investing 98-107.
"New Covenant Funds." New Covenant Funds. Presbyterian Foundation Group. Web.
"New Research Finds That Protestants And Catholics Have A Similar Work Ethic." Royal
Economic Society. Wiley-Blackwell, Sept. 2010. Web. 20 July 2014
Newport, Frank. "In U.S., Four in 10 Report Attending Church in Last Week." Gallup Politics.
Gallup Inc., 24 Dec. 2013. Web.
Peifer, Jared L. (2011). "Morality in the Financial Market? A Look at Religiously Affiliated
Mutual Funds in the USA." Socio-Economic Review 9(2).
"Performance + Values." GuideStone Funds. Foreside Funds Distributors LLC, 2014. Web.
Rouwenhorst, K. G. (2004). The origins of mutual funds. Yale ICF Working Paper No. 07-48
Rubio, Jose F., Neal C. Maroney, and M. Kabir Hassan. Can Efficiency of Returns Be
Considered as a Pricing Factor? Diss. U of New Orleans, 2014. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Print.
Rubio, Jose Francisco, M. Kabir Hassan, and Hesham Jamil Merdad. (2012). "Non-parametric
performance measurement of international and Islamic mutual funds." Accounting
Research Journal 25.3 208-226.
Sharpe, William F. (1966). "Mutual fund performance." Journal of business 119-138.
Sharpe, W. F. (1994). The Sharpe Ratio. The journal of portfolio management, 21(1), 49-58.
Shu, Tao, Johan Sulaeman, and P. Eric Yeung. (2012). "Local religious beliefs and mutual fund
risk-taking behaviors." Management Science 58.10 1779-1796.
Statman, Meir. (2000). "Socially responsible mutual funds." Financial Analysts Journal 30-39.
86

"Thrivent Financial | Annuities, Insurance, Mutual Funds, IRAs & More." Thrivent Financial for
Lutherans. 10 July 2014. Web.
"Timothy Plan® | Biblically Responsible Investing." Timothy Plan® | Biblically Responsible
Investing. 2014. Web.
Treynor, Jack L. (1965). "How to rate management of investment funds." Harvard business
review 43.1 63-75.
Waddock, Sandra A., and Samuel B. Graves. (1997). "The corporate social performance."
Strategic management journal 8.4 303-319.
Weber, Max. (1904). "1930." The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism.

87

Vita
The author was born in New Orleans, Louisiana in July, 1988. She obtained her Bachelor of
Science degree in Finance and International Business from LeTourneau University in August,
2009. She joined the University of New Orleans Financial Economics Program to pursue a PhD
in Fall, 2011. She earned her Master of Science in Financial Economics in May 2013 and
became a Teaching Assistant thereafter. She was hired tenure-track Assistant Professor in Fall,
2015 in the University of Houston Downtown. She obtained her PhD in Financial Economics
from the University of New Orleans in December, 2015.

88

